# Transitory Earnings Opportunities and Educational Scarring of Men*

Jósef Sigurdsson†

November 16, 2026

**Abstract**

I study how transitory increases in the opportunity cost of schooling affect dropout rates and long-run outcomes. Exploiting a tax-free year in Iceland and comparing teenagers around compulsory schooling age, I document increased dropout rates and a permanent loss in educational attainment for men, but not women. Consequently, men experience substantial lifetime earnings losses, enter occupations with limited career advancement, and are less likely to marry or have children. I show that these findings can be rationalized by a model of schooling decisions in which students either underestimate the returns to education or overestimate how easily they can return to school later. Consistent with the former, dropouts come disproportionately from families where parents earn well despite low education—an environment likely to lead children to underestimate the returns to schooling. These findings show that temporary shocks to the opportunity cost of schooling can leave permanent scars on human capital, which raises the cost of macroeconomic booms and weakens the optimal-tax case for lower taxes on the young.

**JEL Codes**: H24, I21, I26, J16, J24

**Keywords**: Educational attainment; Opportunity cost; Labor supply; Tax reform

*I thank Anna Becker, Jakob Beuschlein, Konrad Burchardi, Saman Darougheh, Andreas Haller, Laura Khoury, Felix Koenig, Fanny Landaud, Jay Lee, Emi Nakamura, Arash Nekoei, Matt Notowidigdo, Miika Päällysaho, Torsten Persson, David Seim, Jón Steinsson, David Strömberg, Dominik Wehr, as well as seminar participants at various institutions for valuable comments and discussions. Special thanks go to Ómar Harðarsson, Ásta M. Urbancic, and other staff members at Statistics Iceland for valuable discussions. I thank H S and Emmy Josephson Grant Foundation, Lydia and Emil Kinander Foundation, Carl Mannerfelt Foundation, and the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation for financial support.

†Stockholm University, CEPR, CESifo, IZA, and RFBerlin. Address: Stockholm University, Department of Economics, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. Email: josef.sigurdsson@su.se.

# 1 Introduction

The opportunity cost of schooling is a central determinant of human capital investment (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1962). Anything that raises the current return to working relative to the future return to education increases the opportunity cost of school attendance. Whether temporary increases in the opportunity cost—such as macroeconomic booms or age-dependent tax policies—have permanent consequences for human capital remains an open question. Standard theory predicts that a temporary increase in opportunity costs should induce dropout only among students close to completing their optimal level of schooling and for whom the marginal return to further schooling is low (Card and Lemieux, 2001b). However, this prediction requires that students correctly perceive the shock as transitory, that re-enrollment remains costless if they leave, and that they have accurate information about the returns to education. If not, even a short-lived increase in opportunity costs can induce students to drop out permanently and suffer lasting earnings losses.

Answering this question requires a shock that temporarily raises the opportunity cost of schooling while leaving the future return to education intact. In this paper, I exploit a one-year tax holiday in Iceland that constitutes exactly such a shock. In the late 1980s, Iceland transitioned to a pay-as-you-earn tax system from one in which taxes were based on the previous year's income (Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega, 2001; Sigurdsson, 2025). During the transition year 1987, no taxes were collected on income earned that year. The reform raised students' net-of-tax wages by approximately 10 percent for a single year. I find that this temporary shock had permanent consequences: young men left school to seize the earnings opportunity, never returned, and suffered substantial losses in lifetime earnings.

I identify causal effects using a regression discontinuity design that combines the timing of the tax reform with a legal school-leaving age of 16. Students who had turned 16 by the time of the tax-free year were eligible to leave school, while those just below the threshold were required to remain enrolled. Since both the timing of the reform and students' dates of birth are exogenous to schooling decisions, comparisons across this threshold identify the causal effect of the temporary increase in opportunity costs on dropout and subsequent outcomes.

The tax-free year led to an increase in school dropout rates. Among men, I estimate a 5 percentage point decline in post-compulsory education completion—an 8 percent decline relative to the control-group completion rate. This effect is primarily driven by increased dropout from four-year academic tracks (high school), typically attended between ages 16 and 20, which serve as the main qualification pathway for university. In contrast, women did not exhibit higher dropout rates during the tax-free year. Although students could in principle delay their education and return later, I find little empirical support for such intertemporal substitution. Tracking students over time, I document that most who dropped out never returned to school.

During the tax-free year, young men took jobs in fishing, manufacturing, and construction, while young women worked as shop assistants or in child and elder care. These occupations resemble those typically held by young men and women in normal years. A key distinction, however, lies in job characteristics: men's jobs, though offering limited prospects for career advance-

ment and flat lifetime earnings, paid significantly higher wages to young men and provided more opportunities for full-time work than those available to women. This disparity offers a plausible explanation for why men were more likely than women to leave school for work. The gender gap in pay is also reflected in pre-reform tax rates, which were nearly twice as high for the average young man as for the average young woman. As a result, the effective increase in opportunity costs induced by the tax-free year was larger for men than for women.

Leaving school prematurely resulted in substantial lifetime earnings losses. Although dropouts initially earned higher incomes right after leaving school, their earnings gradually fell behind those of their peers in adulthood. By prime working age, the tax-free year reduced annual earnings for affected men by 5.1 percent. Losses of this size are hard to reconcile with the prediction that students induced to drop out by a temporary shock are those with the least to lose from leaving school (Willis and Rosen, 1979; Card and Lemieux, 2001b). In addition to the negative effects on labor market outcomes, male dropouts also experienced substantial adverse effects on family formation: they were significantly less likely to marry, less likely to have children, and had fewer children overall. In contrast, for women, the tax-free year had no significant long-run consequences on their labor market outcomes or socioeconomic status, consistent with the absence of effects on their educational attainment.

General equilibrium wage adjustment, which would violate the identifying assumptions of the research design, is unlikely to account for the losses. The affected cohorts make up a small share of the labor force, so the reform leaves economy-wide wages unchanged. Within the affected cohorts, the reduced supply of graduates raises their wages relative to dropouts' only to the extent that workers in different cohorts are imperfect substitutes, and for the range of substitutability estimated in the literature, a calibration of the Card and Lemieux (2001a) model implies that wage adjustment alters average earnings in the affected cohorts by less than half a percent.

To interpret the findings, I develop a model of schooling choice. Heterogeneity in ability, liquidity constraints, psychic costs, and discounting can all amplify the initial dropout response to a temporary shock to opportunity costs, but mechanisms that operate only at the initial dropout margin cannot generate the permanent dropout and earnings losses estimated in the data. Permanent dropout requires re-entry costs, misperceptions about the returns to education, or a combination of the two. The heterogeneity in responses points to misperceptions. Adolescents form beliefs about the returns to education from the adults around them (Manski, 1993; Jensen, 2010), and the dropout response is concentrated among sons of fathers who earn more than their education predicts and in rural communities where local returns to education are low—environments in which the payoff to schooling that students observe is low, even though Mincerian returns to schooling at the time imply that a high-school degree raised earnings by 25–30 percent. A calibration of the model implies that students underestimated the returns to schooling by 10–21 percent. An illustrative calculation based on the earnings gradient among fathers like their own gives 17 percent, within that range.

Re-entry costs may take the form of organizational barriers to re-enrollment, financial or con-

sumption commitments, or psychological switching costs. The data provide little support for the first two: the Icelandic upper-secondary system places few barriers on returning, and the tax-free year had little effect on debt, early parenthood, or car or real-estate ownership among those who left school. The evidence instead points to psychological costs. Surveyed at age 24, most upper-secondary dropouts from around this time report that returning to school would be difficult, and nearly half that they would be better off had they completed their degree. Finally, discounting alone cannot explain the findings—rationalizing permanent dropout through impatience requires parameter values outside the empirically plausible range (Imai et al., 2021; Cohen et al., 2020)—but impatient students place less weight on the long-run returns to re-enrollment, so even modest re-entry costs or misperceptions suffice to generate permanent dropout.

The findings suggest that transitory increases in the opportunity cost of schooling can lead to large losses in human capital and aggregate output. A 10 percent increase in adolescent wages leads to a permanent 1.5 percent loss in years of schooling for the affected cohorts, and back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the human capital losses from the tax-free year contributed to a 0.1–0.2 percent reduction in aggregate output in 2020. These costs suggest that policies aimed at reducing dropout during periods of elevated opportunity costs may be warranted. Raising the compulsory schooling age is one natural instrument.

The findings have direct implications for optimal income taxation. Previous studies have argued that, due to the high elasticity of labor supply among young workers, an optimal labor income tax should be age-based and lower for the young (Kremer, 2002; Weinzierl, 2011). However, my findings introduce a caveat to this proposition. The tax-free year studied in this paper is precisely such a policy, and the results show that even a single year of reduced taxes is sufficient to permanently reduce educational attainment. Young workers trade off labor not only for leisure but also for education, and the human capital losses that result lead to lower incomes in adulthood and ultimately reduce tax revenue. The conventional case for age-dependent taxation should therefore be weighed against these costs, which the present analysis suggests are substantial.

**Related Literature** This paper contributes to the literature on how changes in the opportunity cost of schooling affect educational attainment and long-run outcomes. The most closely related papers are Atkin (2016), Charles et al. (2018), and Carrillo (2020). Atkin (2016) finds that factory openings in Mexico raised the opportunity cost of schooling and reduced educational attainment, though with limited effects on adult earnings. Charles et al. (2018) show that the U.S. housing boom of the 2000s reduced college attendance, with persistent effects on attainment for affected cohorts. Carrillo (2020) exploits coffee price shocks in Colombia and finds that temporary booms permanently reduced schooling and adult earnings, attributing this to present bias. Cleanly identifying the opportunity cost channel, however, is challenging: economic booms raise current earnings opportunities but also alter the perceived lifetime return to education, affect household incomes, and have uncertain duration. The tax holiday, by contrast, raises the net-of-tax wage for a single known year while leaving household incomes and the future return to education unaf-

fected, isolating the opportunity cost channel. Because students knew the shock was transitory, the evidence that most never returned is difficult to reconcile with pure present bias and points instead to re-entry costs and misperceptions about the returns to education. A broader literature has studied the effects of natural resource booms, business cycle fluctuations, and local labor market conditions on educational attainment (Black et al., 2005; Cascio and Narayan, 2020; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1981; Kane, 1994; Betts and McFarland, 1995; Card and Lemieux, 2001b; Cameron and Taber, 2004; Johnson, 2013; Goldin and Katz, 1997; Shah and Steinberg, 2017; Emery et al., 2012).

By following individuals over their full life cycle using administrative data, I can estimate the long-run earnings consequences for the marginal students induced to drop out. These consequences have remained largely elusive in prior studies. Prior evidence presents two contrasting views. One strand finds that dropouts are negatively selected, with low ability and low returns to further schooling (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Heckman et al., 2006a), suggesting those who leave school prematurely lose little by doing so. A second strand finds large returns for students at the margin of dropping out (Oreopoulos, 2007b; Zimmerman, 2014), but attributes these to disadvantage or credit constraints that prevent optimal investment. In either case, the long-run earnings losses from a temporary shock to opportunity costs should be modest—either because those induced to leave have low returns, or because high-return students would not permanently drop out in response to a transitory shock. Yet the dropouts induced by the tax-free year have large implied returns and come predominantly from low-education but above-median earning families—inconsistent with both negative selection and credit constraints.

Finally, the findings contribute to the literature on the widening gender gap in education (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko, 2006; U.S. Department of Education, 2021; Heckman and LaFontaine, 2010). The concentration of dropout responses among men echoes patterns from World War II (Goldin, 1998) and the U.S. fracking boom (Cascio and Narayan, 2020), suggesting that differential exposure to short-term economic opportunities may entrench the gender gap in education.[1]

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the setting and empirical strategy. In Section 3, I present the effects of the tax-free year on school dropout and educational attainment. Then, in Section 4, I estimate the impact on the short- and long-run labor market and socioeconomic outcomes. In Section 5, I present the conceptual framework which I then use in Section 6 to guide the interpretation of the empirical results. I discuss the macroeconomic and policy implications of the results in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, I conclude the paper. Additional background material and auxiliary analyses I relegate to an appendix.

[1] Goldin (2021) summarizes: "*Historically, men have been more likely to drop out of school to work in hot economies, whether it's in the factories of World War II or the fracking mines of the Dakotas. [. . . ]. My biggest immediate worry is that men are making the wrong decision.*"

# 2 Empirical Setting

## 2.1 The Tax-Free Year

On December 6, 1986, the Icelandic Finance Minister announced a tax reform replacing a system in which income taxes were collected with a one-year lag with a withholding-based pay-as-you-earn system, as illustrated in the top panel of Figure 3. To ensure that workers would not have to pay taxes simultaneously on their 1986 and 1987 earnings during the transition, no taxes were collected on 1987 labor income—making all labor income earned that year tax-free. For further details about the reform and its timeline, see Sigurdsson (2025).

The tax-free year created a strong incentive for people of all ages to work more or enter the labor market. As summarized in Table 1, the average tax rate for workers at upper-secondary schooling age (16–20) before the reform was 8.3% (10.1% for men and 5.6% for women), and the marginal rate was 15.8%. The incentive was highly salient: the reform received extensive media coverage, and the tax authorities distributed advertisements and explanatory flyers, making it likely that most adults, including students, were aware of it. Contemporary newspaper reports confirm that students acted on this incentive, with school authorities expressing concern as early as December 1986 and articles in early 1987 documenting an unusually high number of high school students not returning after the holiday break.[2]

## 2.2 The Education System

The Icelandic education system comprises three main levels, supplemented by an optional preschool stage. Children begin school in the fall of the year they turn 6 and complete compulsory education ten years later, in the spring of the year they turn 16 (Figure 3). Upon finishing compulsory schooling, students are eligible to enroll in upper-secondary education (high school), which is effectively tuition-free, with the enrollment rate rising steadily to above 90% by the 2000s (Blöndal, 2014). Admission to upper-secondary schools is determined by scores from standardized tests administered at the end of the 10th grade.

Upper-secondary education is categorized into three types: grammar schools, vocational schools, and comprehensive schools. Grammar and comprehensive schools both offer four-year academic programs culminating in matriculation examinations—a prerequisite for university admission—and together account for roughly 90% of upper-secondary enrollment, with the remainder in vocational schools (Ministry of Education, 2002). These four-year academic programs are commonly referred to as high schools or junior colleges when compared to the U.S. education system. Vocational students have paid practical training in the labor market as part of their education, which gives them more flexibility to temporarily delay the theoretical component of their studies.

[2] Appendix Figure A.6 shows a 0.9% decline in university enrollment during the 1986/1987 academic year compared to the previous year, followed by a further contraction of 3.1% in 1987/1988. As I will discuss, while the school system provides a natural control group for individuals of upper-secondary school age in 1987, no analogous control group exists for university students. Thus, my analysis focuses on delay and dropout from upper-secondary education.

Dropout rates are substantial and re-entry is common: cohort studies report an average dropout rate of about 30%, and the Icelandic upper-secondary system is institutionally flexible, accommodating slow progression and re-enrollment at any age (Blöndal, 2014; Statistics Iceland, 2008). Appendix E documents these patterns in detail and shows that they have been stable over time.

As in most industrialized countries, Icelandic women now attain higher levels of education than men. While high school graduation rates were equal in 1975, women's rates have since risen more rapidly: by 2020, only 0.68 men graduated high school for every woman (Statistics Iceland, 2022b).[3] Male students consistently exhibit higher dropout rates in post-compulsory education—21.1% in academic programs in 2020, compared to 12.9% for women (Statistics Iceland, 2022a).

### 2.3 Data and Sample

The data come from four administrative datasets covering the Icelandic population, all linked via a unique personal identifier. The first is Statistics Iceland's Education Register and Degree Register, which records completed educational attainment for the Icelandic population dating back to 1981, with information on some degrees extending much further back (e.g., university degrees since 1912).[4] I translate attainment into years of schooling using the number of years typically required to achieve each level; further details are provided in Appendix A. The second is a panel of individual tax returns extending back to 1981, containing information on all income sources as well as detailed data on assets and liabilities. The third is employer-employee data constructed from digitized pay slips, containing information on employment, earnings, working time, occupation, and industry; see Sigurdsson (2025) for further details. The fourth is the National Register, from which I obtain a family identifier linking parents and co-residing children.

The sample consists of individuals in the birth cohorts around the school-leaving age threshold during the 1987 tax-free year, who completed compulsory education in Iceland and were alive and resident in Iceland at age 30. The first restriction ensures the sample was present in Iceland at the time they were eligible for upper-secondary schooling; the second ensures they are observed in the tax register during working age.

All monetary values are winsorized from above at the 0.1% level, converted to 2010 prices using the Icelandic CPI, and then converted to US dollars using an exchange rate of 130 Icelandic króna (ISK) per dollar.

### 2.4 Empirical Strategy

My empirical strategy exploits two features, illustrated in Figure 3. First, the Tax-Free Year temporarily raised net-of-tax wages for all workers, providing an exogenous transitory increase in the opportunity cost of schooling. Second, Icelandic education is compulsory up to the year students

[3] Similarly, gender parity in university graduation rates observed in the mid-1980s had shifted by 2020, with nearly twice as many women as men earning bachelor's degrees.

[4] In most cases, education that is started but not completed is not systematically recorded, except where a final degree consists of more than one level and each level is registered separately—as is the case for some vocational degrees.

turn 16, so only those above this threshold could delay or drop out of school to work during the Tax-Free Year.

I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design comparing individuals around the school-leaving age threshold. Specifically, I estimate:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta D_i + f^k(m_i) + D_i \times f^k(m_i) + \gamma \mathsf{X}_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where $y_i$ is the outcome of individual $i$, $D_i = \mathbb{1}(m_i \leqslant 0)$, and $m_i$ is birth month normalized to zero in December 1971. That is, $D_i = 1$ for individuals aged 15 or older as of December 31, 1986—born in 1971 or earlier—and therefore completed compulsory schooling in or before spring 1987, and zero for those still below the school-leaving age. This implies a discrete jump in outside options at the threshold. $f^k(\cdot)$ is a $k^{th}$-order polynomial in $m_i$, interacted with $D_i$ to allow different trends on either side of the threshold. Coefficient $\beta$ identifies the causal effect of the Tax-Free Year from the discrete change in outcomes at the threshold, under the assumption that $\varepsilon_i$ does not jump discontinuously there. Controls $\mathsf{X}_i$ are pre-reform characteristics measured at age 16: location of residence, and indicators for having a child, receiving social insurance, being fatherless or motherless, and receiving disability benefits. These should be uncorrelated with date of birth and so do not affect the estimate of $\beta$, but improve precision.

I estimate equation (1) using a local-linear approach (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) with a bandwidth of four years (48 birth cohort months). The linear polynomial is motivated by the nonparametric analysis in Section 3, and the bandwidth ensures that the above-threshold sample covers individuals of normal upper-secondary school age without including those who would already have completed it. I assess robustness to alternative bandwidths, polynomial degrees, and weights, and apply the bias-correction procedure of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). Following Kolesár and Rothe (2018), I report Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level for time-varying treatment effects.

# 3 Effect on School Dropout

In this section, I analyze the effect of the tax-free year on school dropout, estimate the short and long run effects on educational attainment, and study which jobs students take when leaving school.

## 3.1 Educational Attainment

**Nonparametric Graphical Evidence** Figure 4 plots education by date of birth around the compulsory schooling age threshold. In panel (a), education is measured by having completed post-compulsory education and in panel (b) by years of schooling, both measured at the age of 21.[5] Since standard upper secondary education programs, such as junior college, take four years to

[5] Appendix Figure A.7 plots education by date of birth separately for men and women.

complete, students who complete their studies on time are expected to have completed their degrees by the age of 21. I plot averages over four birth-months within a four-year bandwidth around the age threshold along with fitted linear trends on each side of the threshold and their 95% confidence intervals. The figure represents the graphical counterpart of the regression analysis that follows.

The figure reveals a clear and discrete drop in completion of post-compulsory education—i.e. increased dropout—among individuals who had passed the compulsory schooling age threshold by the time of the tax-free year. This is similarly reflected in years of schooling completed by age 21.

**Regression Estimates** When faced with a temporary increase in the opportunity cost of schooling induced by the tax-free year, students may decide to intertemporally substitute schooling for work before returning and completing their education after the tax-free year. Hence, the reduction in school completion measured at age 21 years might not reflect a permanent reduction in educational attainment. To investigate the dynamics of the effect on educational attainment, I estimate equation (1) separately for each age 16-40. In essence, this is a regression discontinuity-based event study design, in which the impact of dropout during the tax-free year appears at the expected graduation age of 20 years.

Figure 5 contains plots, separated by gender, of the age-specific RD estimates of the effect on post-compulsory education and years of schooling. For post-compulsory education, I present estimates separately for the two main upper-secondary education tracks—junior college and vocational education—but present the overall effect on completing any post-compulsory education in Appendix Figure A.8. Panel (a) plots the estimated effect on men's upper secondary education. The figure documents a difference in men's degree completion that emerges at the expected graduation age of 20 years, consistent with men dropping out of school during the tax-free year. This effect is concentrated in about a 5 percentage point drop in the rate of completion of a junior college degree, with no effect on vocational education. This difference may reflect the structural differences between these tracks in how easy it is to combine work and schooling. Vocational students have paid practical training in the labor market as part of their education and have more options to temporarily delay the theoretical part of their studies. In contrast to intertemporal substitution, this reduction in educational attainment is stable, persistent, and not reversed by students returning to junior college the following year or later in life. While there is some evidence that students complete vocational education in their late 20s, this effect is relatively small and not precisely estimated.[6] As presented in panel (b), this dropout from junior college led to a permanent reduction in men's years of completed schooling by almost 0.15 years.[7]

[6] As I will document in Figure 6, male dropouts disproportionately entered manufacturing and construction jobs. This pattern in Figure 5a might indicate that some of these dropouts return to school to get formal training and certification after having worked in these jobs for several years.

[7] To maintain the focus on the persistence of dropout from upper-secondary school, which is the relevant level of schooling for the treatment group during the tax-free year, the figure estimates the effect on pre-university years of education. Table 2 presents estimates of effects on total years of schooling completed, including years of university education.

Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 5 plot the estimated effects on school completion and years of schooling of women. In stark contrast to the effect on men, the figure reveals no sign that women dropped out of school. Even in the short run, there is little evidence to suggest that women temporarily took time off from school to work during the tax-free year.

Table 2 quantifies the permanent effect of the tax-free year on educational attainment by presenting the estimates of equation (1) for individuals aged 40. The tax-free year reduced post-compulsory education completion among men by 5 percentage points, or 8 percent relative to the below-threshold average. As displayed in Figure 5, there is a persistent reduction in men's pre-university years of schooling of 0.145 years or about 1.5 school months. At the age of 40, the total reduction in years of schooling was estimated at 0.26 years. This loss in education captures both the dropout from junior college, which is a prerequisite for university enrollment, and a reduction in education beyond upper secondary school. While imprecisely estimated, the point estimate implies a 1.8 percentage point reduction in university education.

To put these estimates into perspective, they can be compared with estimates from studies on the long-run impacts of education policies. For example, Fredriksson et al. (2013) study the long-run effects of class size in primary schools in Sweden. They estimate (Table V) that increasing class size by one pupil decreases years of schooling by 0.05 years. My estimates imply that the long-run impact of the tax-free year on educational attainment is as large as the effect of adding five pupils to the class size.

**Robustness and Placebo Tests** I conduct a series of tests to assess the validity and robustness of these results. First, I examine the sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of bandwidth around the compulsory schooling age threshold. In the main specifications, I use a bandwidth of 48 months on each side of the threshold, capturing individuals within the typical upper-secondary school age range on the right and a comparable group on the left. Appendix Figure A.9 evaluates the sensitivity of the estimates to this bandwidth by varying it from 6 to 62 months, either on one side (control) or both sides (control and treatment) of the threshold. Within a very narrow window of less than a year, the estimates are slightly larger than the main estimates but, as expected, less precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size. Beyond a one-year bandwidth, the estimates stabilize, aligning closely in magnitude and statistical precision with those derived using the chosen bandwidth. These results also include estimates based on MSE-optimal bandwidths, which are indicated in the figure.

Appendix Table A.3 presents additional specification checks for the estimation of equation (1). These include using the bias-corrected RD estimator of Calonico et al. (2014), varying the set of controls, kernel weights, and the degree of polynomials in the regressions. Across these specifications, the estimates remain broadly consistent in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.

A potential threat to the validity of the research design would arise if certain parents systematically timed their children's births to align with the compulsory school-age threshold during the tax-free year. However, this scenario seems highly unlikely in this context, as the implications of being born before or after December 1971 were not known until the tax reform was announced

in 1986. Appendix Figure A.10 provides evidence against this concern, showing no abnormal increase in the number of births around the threshold.

To further validate the research design, I conducted placebo tests to check for discontinuities in educational attainment at the relevant age thresholds during placebo tax-free years. Specifically, I tested six placebo thresholds on each side of the actual threshold, resulting in a total of 12 placebo thresholds. For these tests, I used a narrow window of 12 months above and below each threshold, applying the same window to the actual tax-free year for reference. I examined discontinuities in post-compulsory education outcomes, focusing separately on the completion of junior college or vocational degrees for men and women. The results of these placebo tests are presented in Appendix Figure A.11. As shown, these tests revealed no false positives, either before or after the tax-free year.

### 3.2 Which Jobs Did Dropouts Enter?

Having established that students—primarily young men—left school during the tax-free year, I now examine the types of jobs they entered. Figure 6 shows the estimated effect on employment at upper-secondary school age by occupation. Each bar represents the employment share of 16- to 19-year-olds in a given occupation, along with the estimated increase in employment in that occupation, separately for men and women. Occupations are arranged along the x-axis by their pre-reform average income rank among 16- to 19-year-old employees. For example, prior to the reform, 16- to 19-year-olds earned the highest incomes in fishing and the lowest in service jobs.

The figure shows that, during the tax-free year, young men predominantly entered jobs in fishing, manufacturing, and construction. These jobs were primarily manual labor positions or roles requiring minimal specialized training, although there was also a notable increase in employment among craftsmen in construction and manufacturing. This pattern, in conjunction with the evidence of limited dropout from vocational tracks, suggests that vocational students may have increased their work alongside schooling or prioritized completing their paid practical training while postponing the theoretical components of their studies. In contrast, young women mainly entered jobs as shop assistants or in child and elderly care.

The jobs that young men took during the tax-free year appear to have had a lasting effect on their career trajectories. Appendix Figure A.15 shows that, by prime age, men who were affected by the tax-free year were disproportionately employed in industries similar to those they initially entered, such as manufacturing and construction.[8]

These results provide a plausible explanation for why young men were more likely than young women to leave school to work during the tax-free year. First, the jobs available to men—such as those in fishing, manufacturing, and construction—were, on average, significantly better paid than those available to women. This is reflected in the gender differences in pre-reform tax rates, as shown in Table 1, where young men faced tax rates nearly twice as high as those faced by

[8]Jobs at prime age are classified by industry rather than occupation due to the lack of consistent occupational data for the years when the affected cohorts reached prime working age.

young women. Consequently, the monetary incentives for men to leave school and work during the tax-free year were much greater than for women. Second, the jobs men entered were more likely to offer full-time, permanent employment, whereas the jobs available to women were more often short-term or part-time. This interpretation aligns with the absence of evidence of increased dropout rates among women, suggesting that although some women took advantage of the tax-free year to work alongside schooling and earn tax-free income, it did not significantly impact their schooling decisions.

# 4 Effects on Long-Run Outcomes

In the previous section, I documented that for a portion of young men, the tax-free year marked the end of their education—they dropped out of school and never returned. In this section, I examine the long-run consequences of this decision.

## 4.1 Labor Market Outcomes

**Nonparametric Graphical Evidence** Figure 7 examines non-parametrically the effect of the tax-free year on labor income. Panels (a) and (b) plot the average labor income by date of birth of men and women, respectively, at ages 16-20. The figure reveals a clear discrete jump in labor earnings of men that were above the compulsory-schooling age threshold at the time of the tax-free year. Appendix Figure A.12 displays a similar discrete jump in employment.[9] For women, there is a small increase in earnings at the threshold, which, in conjunction with the results presented in the previous section, is consistent with young women working alongside school during the tax-free year.

In conjunction with the estimates presented in the previous section, these results suggest that young men dropped out of school to work and earn tax-free income. Panels (c) and (d) plot the average labor income by date of birth for men and women, respectively, at prime age (31-40 years). The figure shows a decline in average labor income among men who were above the schooling-age threshold, indicating that men who dropped out of school earn lower incomes in adulthood. For women, there is no visible discontinuity in earnings at the threshold.

**Regression Estimates** Figure 8 presents estimates of the effects on labor income over the lifecycle. The figure presents estimates of regression equation (1) of the average annual earnings at 5-year age ranges, from age 16 to 40, separately for men and women. Focusing first on the effect on labor earnings at upper-secondary school age, quantifying the discontinuity displayed in Figure

[9] Employment is defined as earning at least $10,000 per year. This threshold is motivated by the near-universal participation of Icelandic teenagers in paid work: more than 90% hold summer jobs—often just a few weeks—and between one-quarter and one-third work during term time or other holidays (Rafnsdóttir, 1999). In normal years most students therefore earn some income, and the $10,000 threshold is set to exclude these short spells, corresponding roughly to minimum wage earnings for a low-skilled worker working full-time. Appendix Figure A.13 explores robustness to this threshold: the estimated employment effect is positive and statistically significant above $6,000, and the point estimates are stable at $9,000 and above.

7, panel (a), I estimate that the discontinuity amounts to $838 or about an 8 percent increase in the annual labor income of young men compared to the below-threshold average. For women, the effect is substantially smaller and imprecisely estimated at $96, which corresponds to a 1.3 percent increase. Similarly, I estimate an increase in youth employment. Reported in Table 3, the increase in the employment rate of men at upper-secondary school age amounts to 5 percentage points or about a 12 percent increase compared to the below-threshold average.[10] The table also documents an increase in the employment rate of women by 2 percentage points. When viewed in the light of the results from the previous section, this suggests that women took the opportunity to earn tax-free income, but did so while attending school and did not drop out of school as a consequence.

A priori, the long-term consequences of school dropout are unclear. For some students, the decision to drop out may be rationalized on the grounds of low returns to schooling relative to the transitory increase in the opportunity cost. If true, they will not fare worse in terms of income than if they had stayed (Willis and Rosen, 1979). However, if dropouts have high returns to education, dropping out will lead to long-term earnings losses.

Figure 8, panel (a), shows that while male dropouts gain in the short run, during adulthood their labor income gradually falls behind the earnings of the control group which was still at compulsory schooling age. During the early 20s, there is a positive but not statistically significant effect on income, reflecting that those who stay and complete junior college are also more likely to continue to university, as well as possibly reflecting that dropouts are accumulating experience in the labor market which yields a return. However, by the time men reach 40, their loss in annual earnings amounts to about $2,100, or 5.1% when compared to the below-threshold average. This effect is driven by lower earnings during employment, as there is no statistically significant effect on employment during adulthood, reported in Table 3. In comparison, the corresponding estimates for women are close to and not statistically different from zero.

Figure 8, panel (b), further illustrates the dynamics of the effect on earnings, showing the net effect of school dropout on lifetime earnings. First, the bars at age 20 present the cumulative effect on earnings during upper-secondary school age, 16-20. For men, the cumulative increase in earnings is estimated at $3,400 but for women, the corresponding estimate is small and not statistically significant. Next, the connected dots present the effect on cumulative earnings at each age, from age 21 to 40. By the late 20s, the initial gain has disappeared and dropouts gradually fall behind in terms of lifetime earnings during their 30s. At age 40, affected men have lost on average $27,700, or 4.2 percent, in cumulative lifetime income.

The estimates reported above capture the reduced-form, or intention-to-treat, effect of the tax-free year on earnings. To further interpret these results, it is useful to quantify the effect of school dropout on earnings—that is, the local average treatment effect for compliers who left school due to the reform. A natural approach is to use an instrumental variables (IV) strategy, where the first

[10] Employment is defined as annual labor income above a threshold of $10,000, roughly corresponding to minimum wage earnings for a low-skilled worker. I report the robustness of the estimates to this threshold in Appendix Figure A.13.

stage leverages the RD estimate of the tax-free year's impact on years of schooling, and the second stage estimates the effect of education on earnings using an RD-IV regression with an indicator for the compulsory schooling age threshold as an instrument. However, this approach identifies a causal effect only if the tax-free year affects earnings solely through its impact on educational attainment. This exclusion restriction may not hold if the reform had direct effects on earnings through channels other than schooling—for instance, by shaping the early career trajectories of those who dropped out in ways that persist independently of their educational attainment, or by altering labor market conditions through general equilibrium effects that affected the returns to education for those who stayed. Bearing these caveats in mind, I proceed with the IV estimation while investigating both of these potential violations in the analysis that follows.

I report the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression estimates for men in Appendix Table A.5. Each additional year of schooling lost to the reform is estimated to reduce annual prime-age earnings by approximately 19 percent and lifetime earnings through age 40 by 17 percent. The first-stage F-statistics are in the range of 7–9, suggesting some caution is warranted in interpreting the precision of these estimates. These implied returns are somewhat higher than conventional IV estimates of the average return to compulsory schooling, which range from 10 to 14 percent (see, e.g., Card, 1999; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Harmon and Walker, 1995), but are consistent with IV estimates that identify the effect of schooling specifically for students at the margin of dropping out. A well-established finding is that such IV estimates exceed OLS estimates in part because instruments tend to identify returns for students with particularly high gains from schooling (Oreopoulos, 2006; Carneiro et al., 2011). Exploiting changes in compulsory schooling laws across the US, Canada, and the UK, Oreopoulos (2007a) estimates that staying in school an additional year increases lifetime wealth by roughly 17 percent under IV estimation. Using a regression discontinuity around college admission thresholds in Florida, Zimmerman (2014) finds earnings gains of 22 percent, with even larger effects for men and students of low-income backgrounds. In both cases the returns are largest for disadvantaged students, for whom credit constraints are a plausible explanation (see also Oreopoulos, 2007b). By contrast, as I will document, the young men who dropped out in response to the tax-free year came predominantly from families with above-median incomes, making liquidity constraints an unlikely explanation for their high implied returns. Moreover, even for students who were credit-constrained, theory predicts that a transitory increase in take-home wages should have increased rather than reduced permanent schooling: a constrained student who drops out temporarily to accumulate savings would rationally return to school once the tax holiday ends, raising completed attainment if anything. The high implied returns therefore point instead to mechanisms such as misperceptions about the returns to schooling or barriers to re-entry that cause students who would benefit financially from continued education to drop out permanently. I examine these mechanisms directly in the analysis that follows.[11]

[11]It is worth noting that the earnings losses I estimate do not reflect post-1987 trends in returns to education or in the prospects of blue-collar workers. Appendix Figure A.20 shows that Mincerian returns to schooling were relatively stable throughout the sample period in both urban and rural areas, and that there was no systematic deterioration in

**General Equilibrium Effects** A concern is that the estimated effects on earnings partly reflect general equilibrium wage adjustment rather than the direct consequences of dropping out. Economy-wide wage effects are unlikely to begin with: the affected cohorts of men make up about 4 percent of the working-age population, and whatever effect the reform has on economy-wide relative supply is common to adjacent cohorts and cancels in the regression discontinuity comparison. The relevant concern is within the affected cohorts. The decline in degree completion reduces their own supply of educated workers, which may widen the wage gap between graduates and dropouts within these cohorts and violate the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). I assess this channel in the framework of Card and Lemieux (2001a), in which workers with the same education but from different cohorts are imperfect substitutes (see Appendix B). In the model, the wage gap between dropouts and graduates within an affected cohort $j$, relative to an adjacent unaffected cohort $j'$, responds to the reform-induced change in their relative supply according to

$$\Delta \ln \left( \frac{w_{jt}^{L}}{w_{jt}^{H}} \right) = -\frac{1}{\sigma_A} \Delta \ln \left( \frac{L_{jt}}{H_{jt}} \right) \tag{2}$$

where $\sigma_A$ is the elasticity of substitution between workers in different birth cohorts but with the same education, and $\Delta$ denotes the difference between the affected and the adjacent cohort. The adjustment lowers dropouts' wages and raises graduates' wages in the affected cohorts. To first order, the cohort's average wage changes by $(1 - 1/\sigma_A)$ times the composition effect of dropout at fixed wages: the adjustment offsets a fraction $1/\sigma_A$ of the direct loss, because the gain accrues to graduates, the larger and better-paid group. For elasticities in the range estimated in the literature, graduates' wages relative to dropouts' rise by between 0.7 and 5.8 percent, and by 1.9 percent for the estimate most appropriate to this setting; the effect on the cohorts' average earnings—the object the regression discontinuity design estimates—is small and positive, offsetting at most 8 percent of the estimated earnings decline (Appendix Figure A.1). Wage adjustment therefore cannot account for the estimated earnings losses and, if anything, leads the regression discontinuity estimates to understate them.[12]

A distinct general equilibrium effect concerns the dropout decision itself. As documented in Sigurdsson (2025), the tax-free year generated a strong labor supply response among adults across the labor market. Appendix Figure A.23 shows that these responses were stronger in rural than urban areas and in manual occupations—precisely the segments where school dropout was concentrated (see Figures 6 and 11). If older and younger workers are complements in production, this expansion in labor market activity may have facilitated entry for young workers, making jobs easier to find and amplifying the dropout response beyond what individual incentives alone

the earnings premia of fishing, manufacturing, and construction in the decades following the reform.

[12] A further potential spillover operates through school quality: if male dropout reduced class sizes, remaining students may have benefited from improved learning conditions, potentially boosting the earnings of both men and women who stayed in school. This channel would therefore predict positive earnings effects among women, who stayed in school while class sizes fell, as well as among men who completed their education. The absence of any such effect among women, documented in Figure 8, argues against this mechanism being quantitatively important.

would predict. In this sense, the estimated dropout effect should be interpreted as an equilibrium outcome, reflecting both the direct incentive effects of the tax-free year and this labor demand channel. Importantly, however, Sigurdsson (2025) documents that the labor supply responses of older workers were entirely transitory, reverting to pre-reform levels in the year following the tax-free year.[13] The same conditions that facilitated entry during the tax-free year did not persist, and so this channel cannot account for the permanent character of the dropout effect.

**Robustness** I assess the sensitivity of my results through several robustness checks. Appendix Figure A.14 examines how the estimated effects on labor income at both upper-secondary schooling age and prime age vary with the bandwidth, ranging from 6 to 62 months, applied either to one side (control) or both sides (control and treatment) of the threshold. With the exception of very narrow bandwidths around the compulsory schooling age, the estimates remain stable in magnitude and statistical precision, closely aligning with those obtained using the chosen bandwidth. This includes estimates based on MSE-optimal bandwidths, which are marked in the figure. Appendix Figure A.22 reports placebo tests at alternative birth-cohort cutoffs among cohorts still of compulsory schooling age during the tax-free year, analogous to the placebo tests for educational attainment in Appendix Figure A.11. None of the placebo estimates for prime-age earnings is statistically distinguishable from zero.

### 4.2 Career Progression

To measure career progression, I rank all workers within firms or industries by their residualized earnings, controlling for gender and age. Figure 9 presents the estimated effect on within-firm or within-industry rank over the life cycle. Workers in affected cohorts start, if anything, at a higher relative pay than the control group, but by prime age, their earnings rank is approximately 4 percent lower. The earnings losses thus reflect fewer promotions and slower career advancement rather than lower starting wages. This finding aligns with evidence that most lifetime earnings growth for young men occurs through career advancement during the first decade in the labor market (Topel and Ward, 1992).[14] Consistent with this, Appendix Figure A.15 shows that affected men remain disproportionately employed in fishing, manufacturing, and construction at prime age, suggesting that early career exposure to these industries during the tax-free year had lasting effects on occupational trajectories, with potential direct earnings implications.

[13] Firm investment responded similarly: Sigurdsson (2025) documents elevated growth in the capital stock—primarily machines, equipment, and buildings—in 1987 relative to surrounding years, consistent with firms front-loading investment in anticipation of increased labor supply. This investment expansion was likewise transitory, reverting to pre-reform levels the following year.

[14] Appendix Figure A.16 examines whether dropouts entered firms or industries with systematically different pay premiums using the AKM decomposition (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999). Dropouts appear to have entered through firms and industries offering relatively high starting pay, with no difference in pay premiums at prime age.

### 4.3 Wealth and Non-Labor Income

Is the financial impact of dropout mitigated through the accumulation of wealth, e.g. by dropouts beginning to save or purchasing real estate earlier than those that stay longer in school? To investigate this I estimate the effect on wealth and non-labor income at prime age. The results are presented in Table 3. For men at prime age, I estimate a negative effect on total wealth of $15,500 or a loss of 8.3 percent when compared to the below-threshold average. This effect is primarily driven by less real-estate wealth with a smaller and not statistically significant effect on financial wealth. In addition, I estimate a negative, but not statistically significant, effect on non-labor income, including capital income. In sum, this implies that while the impact of school dropout on future finances is primarily mediated through the labor market, this impact seems to have been enlarged through reduced saving and wealth accumulation.

### 4.4 Marriage and Fertility

In addition to its negative impact on careers, dropping out of school may also affect men's family formation. There are two main channels. First, economic theory suggests that men's economic prospects influence marriage decisions: in the Becker (1973) framework, marriage gains arise from spousal specialization, so a decline in men's earnings reduces women's gains from marriage and shrinks the pool of "marriageable" men (Wilson and Neckerman, 1986). Second, extensive research documents educational assortative mating (Mare, 1991; Pencavel, 1998) and the role of schools as marriage markets (Blossfeld, 2009; Kirkebøen, Leuven, Mogstad, and Mountjoy, 2021).

To explore this, I estimate the effects on marriage and fertility in the affected cohorts. The results, shown in Figure 10, indicate that male dropouts were significantly less likely to marry or have children.[15] By age 40, affected men were about 6 percent less likely to be married, 4.8 percent less likely to have children, and had on average 0.10 fewer children—a 5 percent decline.[16] In contrast, there was no reduction in marriage or fertility among affected women. These findings align with earlier research showing that declines in men's earnings and employment due to external shocks—such as downturns in coal and steel industries, increased import competition from China, and the U.S. fracking boom—led to reductions in marriage and fertility (Black et al., 2003; Autor et al., 2019; Kearney and Wilson, 2018; Schaller, 2016). Comparing the estimated effects on marriage and fertility to prior studies of windfall income effects (Cesarini et al., 2021; Golosov et al., 2024; Lovenheim and Mumford, 2013) suggests that income effects from permanent earnings losses may partly account for the findings, though the estimated effects are generally larger in magnitude.

[15] Figure A.17 in the Appendix plots the RD graphs for marriage and fertility by gender.

[16] Between 1991 and 2000, the average age at first marriage was 31.2 years for men and 29 years for women, and the average age of first-time fathers was 27.6 years, with a fertility rate of 2.1 children.

# 5 Model of School Dropout

Building on the human capital investment framework (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1962), I develop a model of schooling choice that incorporates ability heterogeneity, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, liquidity constraints, psychic costs, re-entry frictions, and misperceptions about returns to education. The model identifies which combinations of these ingredients can generate the permanent dropout and associated earnings losses observed in the data, and which cannot.

## 5.1 Setup

There is a unit mass of infinitely-lived young adults who have completed compulsory schooling. In period $t = 0$, they choose between continuing schooling for an additional year or leaving school to work. If they stay in school, they graduate in a year and then enter the labor market in $t = 1$. If they drop out, they can choose to re-enter in $t = 1$ or leave school permanently and stay in the labor market. In periods $t = 2, \ldots, \infty$ everyone works. Individuals derive utility from consuming their disposable income every period. Therefore, they choose their level of schooling to maximize the present discounted value of lifetime earnings, net of costs, discounting future income at the rate $\beta\delta^t$, where $\delta \in (0, 1)$ represents the exponential discount factor, and $\beta \leqslant 1$ accounts for potential myopia or present bias (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997).

Attending school entails a cost $\kappa$, which captures both direct monetary costs—such as tuition and living expenses—and non-monetary or psychic costs.[17] Individuals without post-compulsory education earn a fixed income in each period, normalized to unity. In contrast, individuals with post-compulsory education earn a return, $\rho$, proportional to their economic ability, $\theta$. Ability is assumed to be uniformly distributed, $\theta \sim U[0, 1]$. Income is subject to tax, which is $\tau_0$ in the initial period and assumed constant, $\tau_t = \tau$, in all periods $t > 0$.

In the initial time period, individuals therefore face the choice between three lifetime streams of utility:

$$\text{Stay in school:} \quad -\kappa + (1-\tau)\rho\theta \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta\delta^t \tag{3}$$

$$\text{Temporary dropout:} \quad (1-\tau_0) - \beta\delta\,\kappa + (1-\tau)\rho\theta \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \beta\delta^t \tag{4}$$

$$\text{Permanent dropout:} \quad (1-\tau_0) + (1-\tau) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta\delta^t. \tag{5}$$

Individuals choose to attend school if the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. Comparing utility streams (3) and (5) provides the following schooling condition:

[17] In the benchmark model, schooling costs are assumed to be constant over time and students do not face liquidity constraints. Appendix C relaxes these assumptions and shows that while liquidity constraints affect who drops out initially, they do not generate permanent dropout, because all induced leavers optimally return to school once the tax-free year ends.

$$\underbrace{\frac{\beta\,\delta}{1-\delta}\,(1-\tau)\,(\rho\theta-1)}_{\text{Marginal benefit}} \geqslant \underbrace{(1-\tau_0)}_{\text{Opportunity cost}} + \underbrace{\kappa}_{\text{Direct cost}} \tag{6}$$

which shows that young adults choose to attend school if the earnings gain exceeds the marginal cost, which consists of the opportunity cost—the net-of-tax earnings students must give up to attend school—and the direct cost of schooling, including the psychic cost.

Using the three utility streams, we can derive thresholds that split the population in three segments based on their schooling decisions. First, from (3) and (4), we get a threshold for young adults to stay in school in $t = 0$:

$$\theta_0^* = \frac{(1-\tau_0) \;+\; \kappa(1-\beta\delta)}{\beta\,\delta\,(1-\tau)\,\rho} \tag{7}$$

Second, viewed from the $t = 1$ vantage point after working in $t = 0$, when the re-entry decision is made, the individual compares returning to school with remaining in the labor market. Returning to school entails the opportunity cost of forgone earnings, $(1-\tau)$, as well as the schooling cost $\kappa$. This yields the re-entry threshold:

$$\theta_1^* = \frac{\beta\delta(1-\tau) + (1-\delta)\big[(1-\tau)+\kappa\big]}{\beta\,\delta\,(1-\tau)\,\rho}. \tag{8}$$

The two thresholds partition the population of young adults into three segments based on their ability level, as illustrated in Figure 1. First, students with $\theta \geqslant \theta_0^*$ stay in school in $t = 0$. Second, students with $\theta_1^* \leqslant \theta < \theta_0^*$ leave school in $t = 0$, but return in $t = 1$. Third, students with $\theta < \theta_1^*$ leave school in $t = 0$ and never return.




Figure 1: Schooling decisions by ability

## 5.2 Temporary Dropout

To evaluate the effect of the tax-free year ($\tau_0 < \tau$) on school dropout, we study the comparative statics of the stay-in-school threshold (7) and the re-entry threshold (8). Differentiating $\theta_0^*$ and $\theta_1^*$ with respect to $\tau_0$ yields

$$\frac{\partial\theta_0^*}{\partial\tau_0} = -\frac{1}{\beta\delta(1-\tau)\rho} < 0, \qquad \frac{\partial\theta_1^*}{\partial\tau_0} = 0.$$

As a result, the tax-free year leads a share of students to drop out temporarily in $t = 0$ and return in $t = 1$, but does not affect the share of individuals who permanently leave school.

Appendix C extends this benchmark model and investigates the implications of liquidity constraints, psychic costs, time-discounting, and present bias. Liquidity constraints and psychic costs shift the set of marginal students, while impatience and present bias amplify the initial dropout response to the tax-free year. Importantly, in the absence of frictions at the re-entry margin, these extensions do not alter the central prediction of the benchmark model: the tax-free year generates only temporary dropout. As discussed below, future discounting matters primarily through its interaction with re-entry frictions, reinforcing their effect in generating permanent dropout.

Figure 2, panel (a), illustrates the effect of the tax-free year on temporary dropout and the associated effect on earnings. The figure plots the earnings gain from temporary dropout relative to staying in school as a function of ability. Individuals with $\theta \in [\theta_1^*, \theta_0^*]$ drop out temporarily during the tax-free year and gain from doing so. The shaded blue area is the aggregate earnings gain, the integral of this earnings difference over the induced leavers.

### 5.3 Permanent Dropout

The benchmark model and its extensions predict that, absent frictions at the re-entry margin, a tax-free year generates only temporary dropout: students respond to the short-run incentive by leaving school in $t = 0$ but optimally return once the incentive expires. This subsection shows how distortions at the re-entry stage—through re-entry costs or misperceived returns—can rationalize the permanent dropout and associated large earnings losses observed in the data.

**Re-entry costs** Now let us assume, as before, that students who leave school in $t = 0$ can return in $t = 1$, but returning to school is subject to a cost $\gamma > 0$. This cost captures possible financial costs, consumption commitments, psychological costs, or organizational barriers to re-enrollment. Moreover, let us first assume $\gamma$ is known at the time of the initial schooling decision.

As before, the tax-free year affects the initial enrollment cutoff but not the re-entry cutoff. Anticipated re-entry costs also affect the level of both cutoffs: they reduce the incentive to leave school initially, because students internalize the cost of returning, and they raise the cutoff for re-entry. However, whether the students induced to leave drop out temporarily or permanently depends on the position of the re-entry cutoff $\theta_1^*$ relative to the set of students who leave school as a result of the tax-free year, $[\,\theta_0^*(\tau),\, \theta_0^*(\tau_0)\,)$. As shown in Appendix C, this comparison yields two critical threshold values for the re-entry cost:

$$\gamma_T \equiv \frac{\delta(1-\beta)\big[(1-\tau)+\kappa\big]}{1-\delta(1-\beta)}, \qquad \gamma_P \equiv \frac{(\tau-\tau_0)+\delta(1-\beta)\big[(1-\tau)+\kappa\big]}{1-\delta(1-\beta)}.$$

These thresholds imply that: (i) if $\gamma \leqslant \gamma_T$, all induced leavers re-enter in $t = 1$ and the tax-free year generates only temporary dropout; (ii) if $\gamma_T < \gamma < \gamma_P$, the tax-free year induces a mix of temporary and permanent dropout; and (iii) if $\gamma \geqslant \gamma_P$, none of the induced leavers return and the tax-free year generates only permanent dropout. Permanent dropout therefore does not arise because the tax-free year changes the value of schooling per se, but because it interacts with

(a): Temporary dropout




(b) Permanent dropout: Re-entry cost




(c) Permanent dropout: Misperception




Figure 2: The Effect of Tax-Free Year on Dropout and Earnings

*Note:* This figure illustrates the effect of a tax-free year on schooling decisions and earnings. Panel (a) shows the benchmark case, in which the tax-free year induces only temporary dropout: some students leave school in $t = 0$ but return in $t = 1$, generating a short-run earnings gain. The solid blue line shows earnings from temporary dropout relative to staying in school, while the solid gray line shows earnings under permanent dropout for reference. The shaded blue area represents the aggregate earnings gain from temporary dropout. Panel (b) introduces re-entry costs, which can turn initial dropout into permanent dropout. In the case shown, some students who leave school in response to the tax-free year do not return in $t = 1$. The solid orange line shows earnings from permanent dropout relative to staying in school, and the shaded orange area represents the associated long-run earnings loss. Panel (c) introduces misperception about returns to schooling. When students perceive returns to schooling as lower than they truly are, the relevant dropout and re-entry thresholds rise. As a result, the students induced to leave school by the tax-free year are of higher ability, and permanent dropout generates larger long-run earnings losses.

frictions that prevent students from returning once they have left. Both thresholds depend on discounting: lower values of $\delta$ or $\beta$ reduce the value of future schooling returns and amplify the effect of re-entry frictions. In the benchmark case with $\beta = 1$, the thresholds simplify to $\gamma_T = 0$ and $\gamma_P = \tau - \tau_0$: the tax-free year determines who leaves school initially, while even modest incremental re-entry costs can turn those initial exits into permanent dropout.

While some components of the re-entry cost $\gamma$—such as organizational frictions—are likely to be known in advance, others—such as consumption commitments or the psychic costs of returning to school—may not be fully anticipated. We therefore also consider the case in which re-entry costs are unanticipated at the time of the initial schooling decision. This assumption captures both the possibility that students hold incorrect beliefs about re-entry costs and that their circumstances change between $t = 0$ and $t = 1$ in ways that make returning to school costly. In this case, students who leave school in $t = 0$ discover in $t = 1$ that re-entering entails a cost $\gamma > 0$, which raises the re-entry cutoff to

$$\theta_1^*(\gamma) = \theta_1^*(0) + \frac{\gamma(1-\delta)}{\beta\delta(1-\tau)\rho} \;>\; \theta_1^*(0).$$

Unanticipated re-entry costs are particularly potent because they distort decisions at the re-entry stage without being internalized at $t = 0$. As shown formally in Appendix C, this mechanism strictly increases permanent dropout relative to the anticipated-cost case for any given $\gamma$, since some students leave school expecting to return but are later deterred by unexpectedly high re-entry barriers.

Figure 2, panel (b), illustrates how the tax-free year affects dropout and earnings when students face re-entry costs. The figure shows the case in which the re-entry cutoff lies inside the set of students induced to leave school by the tax-free year. Induced leavers below the re-entry cutoff do not return and become permanent dropouts, and they incur an earnings loss relative to staying in school. The shaded orange area is the aggregate loss, the integral of the earnings difference from permanent dropout over the induced leavers who remain below the re-entry cutoff.

**Misperceived Returns to Education** I now extend the model to allow individuals to hold incorrect beliefs about the return to schooling. Following the subjective-expectations framework in Manski (1993), individuals form beliefs about the earnings return $\rho$ based on the educational and labor market outcomes they observe in their reference group—parents, peers, coworkers, or others in their social environment. Such misperception generates a distortion of the true return:

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\rho] = (1 - \varepsilon_t)\rho$$

where $\varepsilon_t$ is a (possibly time-varying) misperception parameter. If $\varepsilon_t = 0$, beliefs are correct; if $\varepsilon_t > 0$, the return is underestimated; and if $\varepsilon_t < 0$, it is overestimated.

Misperception about returns to schooling affects both the initial school-leaving decision and

the re-entry margin. Underestimating returns raises the stay-in-school and re-entry thresholds,

$$\frac{\partial \theta_0^*}{\partial \varepsilon_0} = \frac{\theta_0^*}{1-\varepsilon_0} > 0, \qquad \frac{\partial \theta_1^*}{\partial \varepsilon_1} = \frac{\theta_1^*}{1-\varepsilon_1} > 0,$$

making schooling less attractive at both stages. Pessimistic beliefs also amplify the response to the tax-free year at enrollment. Since

$$\frac{\partial^2 \theta_0^*}{\partial \tau_0 \, \partial \varepsilon_0} = -\frac{1}{\beta\delta(1-\tau)\rho(1-\varepsilon_0)^2} < 0,$$

a reduction in $\tau_0$ raises $\theta_0^*$ by more when perceived returns are lower. By the same logic, misperception makes the re-entry decision more sensitive to re-entry costs: the effect of $\gamma$ on $\theta_1^*$ is increasing in $\varepsilon_1$, as is immediate from the expression for $\theta_1^*$ in Appendix C.6.

Misperception can therefore generate permanent dropout through two related channels. If students evaluate the initial decision as one between staying in school and leaving permanently, sufficiently pessimistic beliefs can rationalize permanent dropout. If instead students initially plan to return, permanent dropout can arise if perceived returns at the re-entry margin are sufficiently low relative to the beliefs that governed the initial dropout decision, or if re-entry is costly. For example, after leaving school, students may form or update their beliefs based on exposure to environments where returns to education are perceived to be low. Such pessimistic beliefs at the re-entry margin raise the perceived re-entry threshold ex post and can convert an initially temporary response into permanent dropout.

Figure 2, panel (c), shows the effect of the tax-free year on schooling decisions and earnings when students hold pessimistic beliefs about returns to schooling. By lowering the perceived return to schooling, misperception raises the relevant dropout and re-entry thresholds. As a result, the students induced to leave school by the tax-free year can include higher-ability individuals, for whom the long-run earnings loss from permanent dropout is larger.

**Empirical implications** The model helps restrict the set of mechanisms that can explain the permanent dropout and associated earnings losses observed in the data. Permanent dropout arises only when the initial response to the tax-free year interacts with distortions that impede re-entry. Two such distortions are central: re-entry costs and misperception about returns to schooling. These mechanisms operate on the same margin and are complementary: pessimistic beliefs make re-enrollment less attractive and expand the set of students for whom re-entry frictions can turn initial dropout into permanent dropout. Discounting does not by itself generate permanent dropout in response to a temporary shock, but it can amplify these mechanisms by increasing the weight placed on short-run gains relative to long-run returns. These implications guide the empirical analysis that follows.

# 6 Interpreting the Empirical Results

Guided by the model, this section evaluates the mechanisms that can explain why the tax-free year generated permanent school dropout and sizable earnings losses. The model highlights three candidates: misperception of returns to schooling, re-entry costs, and future discounting. I examine each mechanism in turn, using heterogeneity in effects, auxiliary outcomes, and model-based calibration to assess their empirical plausibility.

## 6.1 Misperceived Returns to Education

Misperception about the returns to schooling is a natural candidate mechanism in this setting. Students do not observe the true returns to education directly. Instead, they infer them from the outcomes of people around them—parents, peers, and neighbors (Manski, 1993). Because the information available from this local environment may be incomplete or systematically biased, perceived returns can diverge substantially from actual ones (Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2008). I assess this channel in two ways. First, through heterogeneity in dropout responses across parental background and neighborhood characteristics that plausibly shape beliefs about returns. Second, through a model-based calibration that quantifies the degree of misperception needed to explain the observed dropout and earnings effects, which I validate against both internal and external benchmarks.

Figure 11 reports estimates of the effect of the tax-free year on school dropout among men, allowing the response to vary by parental and neighborhood characteristics.[18] The results reveal pronounced heterogeneity consistent with misperception about returns to schooling. The dropout response is concentrated among sons of parents without a high school degree—who either dropped out of high school themselves or never enrolled. This suggests that these students grew up in households with limited firsthand information about the gains from post-compulsory education. By contrast, splitting by parental income shows that dropout responses are not driven by low-income families and if anything are larger among students from above-median-income households. This pattern directly contradicts a liquidity constraints explanation, under which we would expect the response to be concentrated among poorer families.

A more direct test of the information channel uses fathers' earnings relative to what their education predicts. I estimate cohort-specific Mincerian earnings regressions on a panel covering the full population of men in the fathers' birth cohorts, with year and location fixed effects, and classify the fathers of students in the sample by the sign of their average residual: positive if they earn more than men of the same cohort, education, and location, and negative otherwise. The

[18] Appendix Figure A.18 presents corresponding results for women, and Appendix Figure A.19 the corresponding estimates for men's prime-age labor income. The earnings effects are negative in every group and largest in rural municipalities, in municipalities with low returns to education, and among sons of fathers who earn more than their education predicts—groups with large dropout responses—but the confidence intervals are wide and overlap throughout. A proportional relationship with the dropout effects is not to be expected in any case, since the earnings effect in each group also depends on the return to schooling of the students induced to drop out.

dropout response is concentrated almost entirely among sons of fathers who earn more than their education predicts—precisely the families

The neighborhood-level results point to the same conclusion. Dividing students by rural versus urban residence shows that the dropout response is driven primarily by individuals growing up in rural areas.[19] Classifying students by the educational composition of their municipality yields the same pattern: dropout effects are concentrated in areas with lower adult educational attainment. Splitting by local returns to education reveals substantially larger dropout responses in municipalities where returns to schooling are low.[20]

These patterns align closely with experimental evidence on information frictions in schooling decisions. Providing students with accurate information about returns reduces dropout and improves school performance, with the largest effects occurring among relatively better-off students rather than the poorest (Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2008). This mirrors the parental income finding above: the dropout response to the tax-free year was larger among students from above-median-income households, consistent with information frictions rather than liquidity constraints driving the response. To assess how large misperception about returns would need to be to explain the observed dropout and earnings effects, I now turn to a model-based calibration.

To quantify the degree of misperception consistent with the observed dropout and earnings effects, I calibrate the model using estimated treatment effects and parameter values from the data and the literature. Appendix D describes the procedure and parameter choices in detail.

The calibration depends on how the marginal student evaluates the schooling decision, and I consider two specifications of the marginal student's choice problem. In the first, the marginal student compares staying in school to leaving permanently, without expecting to return. This specification is supported by the empirical finding that the tax-free year did not generate temporary dropout among men (Figure 5): students who left school during the tax-free year did not return, suggesting they may not have anticipated doing so. This calibration implies underestimation of returns of 10–21 percent, depending on parameter values.

In the second, students initially plan to return but subsequently fail to do so, so that permanent dropout arises from the interaction between misperceived returns and re-entry frictions. If there is no re-entry cost beyond the ordinary opportunity cost of returning to school, the calibration implies underestimation of returns of 26–35 percent. As the re-entry cost rises, the required misperception falls: when the re-entry cost equals the change in the opportunity cost induced by the tax-free year, the second calibration coincides with the first, implying underestimation of 10–21 percent. At the other extreme, setting misperception to zero implies that re-entry costs alone

[19] These patterns may also reflect social spillovers in schooling decisions. If a critical mass of peers with low expected returns to education leaves school for work, other students—including those with high underlying returns—may follow due to peer pressure, conformity, or concerns about short-run income or status. Such socially driven exits operate through the same information channels emphasized here, reinforcing pessimistic beliefs about the returns to schooling.

[20] A substantial portion of Iceland's rural population resided in small towns dominated by fishing, fish processing, and manufacturing industries, collectively accounting for roughly 40 percent of local income. These sectors typically offer high wages but low returns to formal education, resulting in lower educational attainment than in urban regions (Nakamura, Sigurdsson, and Steinsson, 2022).

can rationalize permanent dropout only if they are 29–44 percent of annual earnings for workers without post-compulsory education. Thus, permanent dropout can be rationalized by moderate misperception, by substantial re-entry costs, or by a combination of the two.

The internal benchmark is an illustrative calculation based on fathers' earnings, which asks whether misperception of the magnitude the calibration requires is plausible given the information environment of the students who responded to the reform. The key idea, following Manski (1993), is that children observe the outcomes of their own parents, not the full population. A father with high earnings relative to his education conveys a pessimistic signal about the returns to schooling, even if the true population return is high. This is precisely the type of family background in which the dropout response is concentrated: as shown in Figure 11, the effects are strongest among students whose fathers earn more than their education predicts. To gauge the resulting belief distortion, I re-estimate the Mincerian return to schooling among fathers whose earnings exceed what their education predicts and compare it with the full-sample return. Under three assumptions stated in Appendix D—that students infer the return from the earnings–schooling relationship among the adults they observe, take this relationship at face value, and face a true return proportional to the population gradient—the ratio of the two returns corresponds to the perceived return relative to the true return. The restricted-sample return is 17 percent below the full-sample return, within the 10–21 percent range implied by the calibration when students do not consider re-entry or face moderate re-entry costs.

The external benchmark draws on Jensen (2010), who directly elicits expected earnings by schooling level among boys at the end of compulsory schooling in the Dominican Republic and contrasts these beliefs with observed earnings differences. Mapping his estimates into the misperception parameter of the model implies underestimation of returns of 74–78 percent. These estimates are substantially larger than the misperception required by the calibration, suggesting that the belief distortions needed to rationalize the findings are well within the range observed in settings where beliefs are directly measured.

### 6.2 Re-entry Costs

The model predicts that permanent dropout may arise if students who leave school during the tax-free year overestimate how easily they will be able to return. The model formalizes this as a re-entry cost, which may be anticipated at the time of exit or realized only afterward, and which can take several forms: organizational frictions in re-enrollment, financial or consumption commitments that raise the cost of returning, or psychological costs associated with resuming studies. I assess the empirical relevance of each channel in turn.

**Organizational frictions** The Icelandic upper-secondary system is institutionally flexible: it accommodates slow progression, permits re-entry after dropout, and formally accepts students of any age (Blöndal et al., 2010). Organizational frictions are therefore unlikely to be the primary barrier preventing dropouts from returning to school.

This is borne out by the evidence. Appendix E documents upper-secondary school trajectories for the 1975 birth cohort using administrative records on enrollment spells, course-taking, and credits earned, collected directly from all Icelandic upper-secondary schools by Jónasson and Blöndal (2002). Students frequently take breaks or progress at a slower pace than required for on-time completion, and among those who eventually graduate, roughly half of the delay beyond four years is accounted for by semesters on break. That leaving and returning is common even among graduates confirms that the system poses few institutional obstacles to re-enrollment.

Appendix Figure A.3 shows that these patterns generalize well beyond the 1975 cohort. The distribution of age at graduation has been stable from the early 1980s through the 2010s: roughly 60 percent graduate on time at age 20, while 15–20 percent complete at ages 21 or 22 and roughly 10 percent at age 23 or older. The consistency of these patterns across four decades confirms that the 1975 cohort evidence is representative of the broader Icelandic context.

**Financial or consumption commitments** A second potential source of re-entry costs is financial or consumption commitments undertaken after leaving school. Students who leave school and begin working may take on obligations—debt, a car, a home, or early parenthood—that make the income loss associated with returning to school increasingly costly over time. Even if they initially intended to return, such commitments could lock them into continued employment. Appendix Table A.6 tests this channel by estimating the effect of the tax-free year on early-life outcomes at ages 16–20: indicators of having a child, owning a car, holding any debt, holding high debt, and owning real estate. The estimates provide little support for this mechanism: the tax-free year does not increase the likelihood of early parenthood, car ownership, or real-estate ownership, and while there is a small and marginally significant effect on the probability of holding any debt, there is no effect on high debt and the magnitudes are small throughout. The financial commitments of the kind observed in the data therefore appear unlikely to account for the low rate of return among dropouts.

**Psychological costs** The absence of organizational barriers and limited evidence for consumption commitments suggests that re-entry costs, if operative, are most plausibly psychological. To assess this channel directly, I draw on survey evidence from upper-secondary school dropouts in the 1975 birth cohort (Jónasson and Blöndal, 2002).

Appendix Figure A.4 presents the survey responses on dropout decisions and re-entry barriers. The reasons dropouts cite for leaving school are heterogeneous, but one in four cite good job opportunities or financial difficulties, consistent with opportunity costs playing an important role in the dropout decision. When asked to retrospectively assess their decision, 43 percent say dropping out was the wrong choice given the circumstances they faced at the time, and 47 percent say they would be better off in the labor market today had they completed upper-secondary school. Yet when asked whether returning to school would be easy or difficult, 54 percent report it would be difficult. This gap—between recognizing the value of a degree and acting on that recognition—points toward psychological switching costs as a primary barrier to re-entry.

Complementary evidence from the postal survey points in the same direction. Appendix Fig-

ure A.5 shows that among dropouts, 45 percent fall in the lowest third of the self-esteem distribution, compared to only 27 percent among graduates. While the cross-sectional nature of the data makes it difficult to establish whether low self-esteem precedes dropout or is partly a consequence of it, the pattern is consistent with a broad literature showing that noncognitive traits independently predict schooling attainment beyond cognitive ability (Jacob, 2002; Heckman et al., 2006b).

These findings connect naturally to models of schooling that allow for heterogeneous psychic costs. Such models find that psychic costs are quantitatively important in explaining why individuals with positive financial returns to education nevertheless do not pursue further schooling (Cunha et al., 2005; Heckman et al., 2006a). Interruption of schooling may lower academic self-confidence or shift identity away from the student role, raising the subjective cost of re-entry even in the absence of formal barriers. Such mechanisms generate path dependence in schooling choices: once individuals exit, returning becomes psychologically costly—and the longer they remain out, the more costly it becomes.

### 6.3 The Role of Future Discounting

An alternative explanation for permanent dropout is that students heavily discount future returns, prioritizing immediate earnings over higher future wages. The model shows that impatience, whether present bias ($\beta < 1$) or a high exponential discount rate, does not by itself generate permanent dropout in response to the tax-free year, but it amplifies the initial response and reinforces re-entry costs. To assess whether discounting combined with re-entry frictions can rationalize permanent dropout even when returns are correctly perceived, I calculate the discount rates at which permanent dropout is optimal, comparing staying in school with leaving permanently and never returning.[21]

**Implied present bias** I calculate the present-bias parameter $\beta$ required to equate the immediate earnings gain from dropping out with the present discounted value of subsequent earnings losses, assuming an exponential discount rate of 5 percent.[22] This calculation implies $\beta = 0.23$.

This value lies well outside the empirically plausible range. A meta-analysis of experimental studies finds average values of $\beta$ between 0.95 and 0.97, with no studies reporting values below 0.5 (Imai et al., 2021).

**Implied exponential discount rate** An alternative approach calculates the exponential discount rate $\delta$ that equates the earnings gain from dropping out with the present discounted value of subsequent losses, assuming no present bias ($\beta = 1$).[23] The discount rate that satisfies this condition is 18.7 percent (see Appendix Figure A.21).

[21] This calculation is similar in nature to the permanent-dropout calibration of misperception in Appendix D.

[22] This rate is consistent with Iceland's average five-year indexed interest rate of 4.94 percent in 1986.

[23] Specifically, I compute the discount rate that solves $C_{16-20} - \sum_{a=21}^{40} \frac{C_a}{(1+\delta)^{a-20}} = 0$, where $C_{16-20}$ represents the effect on cumulative earnings during upper-secondary school age, and $C_a$ denotes the treatment effect on cumulative earnings at age $a$, both taken from Figure 8, panel (b).

While adolescents exhibit higher discount rates than adults (Gruber, 2001; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Steinberg et al., 2009; Castillo et al., 2011; Levitt et al., 2016), the implied rate lies well above those typically found in the empirical literature on adolescent time preferences (Andersen et al., 2008; Epper et al., 2020; Frederick et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2020).[24]

Discounting, whether through present bias or high exponential discount rates, therefore cannot explain permanent dropout on its own even with complete re-entry frictions, although it likely amplified the response.

Stepping back, the evidence presented in this section points to a combination of misperception about returns to schooling and psychological re-entry costs as the primary explanation for permanent dropout. Organizational frictions and financial commitments play at most a minor role, and discounting alone cannot rationalize the observed patterns at empirically plausible parameter values. The two remaining mechanisms are complementary, with misperception explaining why students were willing to leave school in response to a temporary earnings opportunity, while psychological re-entry costs explain why so few returned once they had left. Together, these mechanisms can account for why a temporary policy produced lasting consequences.

## 7 Implications of Results

The findings point to a cost of economic booms that the literature on the cost of business cycles, which measures welfare losses through intertemporal substitution in consumption (Lucas, 1987; Krebs, 2007; Krusell et al., 2009), does not capture: booms raise the opportunity cost of schooling, divert students from education, and permanently scar human capital. To quantify this channel, I use the tax-free year to compute the elasticity of educational attainment with respect to the opportunity cost of schooling, measuring the change in opportunity cost as the increase in take-home pay the tax-free year created. The elasticity is $-0.15$, implying that a transitory boom that raises teenage wages by 10 percent reduces completed schooling by 1.5 percent for the affected cohorts. Extrapolating to booms warrants caution. Recessions may partly offset the effect by lowering the opportunity cost of schooling, although they can also reduce attainment through borrowing constraints and parental job loss, and the net effects found in the literature are small (Betts and McFarland, 1995; Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003; Oreopoulos et al., 2008; Hilger, 2016; Stuart, 2022; Card and Lemieux, 2001b; Johnson, 2013). Unlike the tax holiday, booms may also change the perceived lifetime return to education, and their duration is unknown ex ante.

The human capital loss also carries an aggregate cost. Back-of-the-envelope calculations, based either on the estimated earnings loss and the affected men's share of the working-age population or on the relationship between schooling and growth, imply that dropout during the tax-free year reduced GDP in 2020 by 0.1 to 0.2 percent.[25]

[24] If discount rates decline linearly by 0.19 percentage points per year, as estimated by Kureishi et al. (2021), the constant rate of 18.7 percent from age 20 to 40 corresponds to approximately 20.6 percent at age 20 and 21.4 percent at ages 16–18, during upper-secondary school.

[25] Appendix F reports both calculations and the computation of the elasticity.

The results also bear on optimal taxation. Age-dependent labor income taxes that are lower for the young have been proposed on the grounds that young workers' labor supply is more elastic (Kremer, 2002; Weinzierl, 2011), following the principle of taxing the most elastic sources of supply least (Ramsey, 1927). Although such a tax reduction is permanent in calendar time, from the individual's perspective it is a temporary increase in the opportunity cost of schooling: workers age out of the preferential rate while the return to education is unchanged. The tax-free year is precisely such a shock, and a single year was enough to permanently reduce educational attainment, because young workers substitute labor not only for leisure but also for education. The case for age-dependent taxation should be weighed against these human capital costs, which this paper suggests are substantial.

The private and public losses from dropout also justify policies that reduce it when opportunity costs are high. The school-leaving age is one instrument. I estimate that had it been 17 rather than 16, dropout during the tax-free year would have been about 40 percent lower.[26] Procyclical student support—grants or low-interest loans during periods of elevated opportunity costs—could complement a higher school-leaving age.

## 8 Conclusion

This paper provides evidence that transitory increases in the opportunity cost of schooling can permanently reduce human capital accumulation. Exploiting a one-year tax holiday in Iceland that raised students' net-of-tax wages for a single year while leaving the future return to education intact, I find that men—but not women—left school to seize the temporary earnings opportunity and never returned. As a result, they suffered substantial lifetime earnings losses, entered occupations with limited career advancement, and were less likely to marry or have children.

The findings are consistent with two complementary mechanisms. First, students underestimated the returns to education—dropout responses were concentrated among those from low-education families and neighborhoods where inferring true returns is especially difficult. Second, students overestimated their ability to return to school later, facing psychological barriers to re-entry that converted what may have begun as a temporary response into a permanent one.

More broadly, the results highlight that temporary shocks to economic incentives can leave lasting scars that far outlast the shock itself. Whether the trigger is an economic boom that raises earnings opportunities for young workers or an age-dependent tax policy that lowers their tax burden, the human capital costs can be large and irreversible.

## References

ABOWD, J. M., F. KRAMARZ, AND D. N. MARGOLIS (1999): "High wage workers and high wage firms," *Econometrica*, 67, 251–333.

[26] To quantify this, I use a difference-in-discontinuity estimation strategy where women serve as a control group for men, based on my main finding that women did not drop out of school. The estimated effect on male dropout using this strategy is 0.036 (SE 0.021). When excluding 16-year-olds, the estimated effect falls to 0.021 (SE 0.031), a reduction of 42 percent.

ACEMOGLU, D. AND J. ANGRIST (2000): "How large are human-capital externalities? Evidence from compulsory schooling laws," *NBER macroeconomics annual*, 15, 9–59.

ANDERSEN, S., G. W. HARRISON, M. I. LAU, AND E. E. RUTSTRÖM (2008): "Eliciting risk and time preferences," *Econometrica*, 76, 583–618.

ATKIN, D. (2016): "Endogenous skill acquisition and export manufacturing in Mexico," *American Economic Review*, 106, 2046–85.

AUTOR, D., D. DORN, AND G. HANSON (2019): "When work disappears: Manufacturing decline and the falling marriage market value of young men," *American Economic Review: Insights*, 1, 161–78.

BECKER, G. S. (1962): "Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis," *Journal of political economy*, 70, 9–49.

——— (1973): "A theory of marriage: Part I," *Journal of Political economy*, 81, 813–846.

BETTINGER, E. AND R. SLONIM (2007): "Patience among children," *Journal of Public Economics*, 91, 343–363.

BETTS, J. R. AND L. L. MCFARLAND (1995): "Safe port in a storm: The impact of labor market conditions on community college enrollments," *Journal of Human resources*, 741–765.

BIANCHI, M., B. R. GUDMUNDSSON, AND G. ZOEGA (2001): "Iceland's natural experiment in supply-side economics," *American Economic Review*, 91, 1564–1579.

BLACK, D. A., T. G. MCKINNISH, AND S. G. SANDERS (2003): "Does the availability of high-wage jobs for low-skilled men affect welfare expenditures? Evidence from shocks to the steel and coal industries," *Journal of Public Economics*, 87, 1921–1942.

——— (2005): "Tight labor markets and the demand for education: Evidence from the coal boom and bust," *ILR Review*, 59, 3–16.

BLÖNDAL, K. S. (2014): "Student disengagement and school dropout: parenting practices as context," Ph.D. thesis, University of Iceland.

BLÖNDAL, K. S., J. T. JÓNASSON, AND A. C. TANNHÄUSER (2010): "Dropout in a Small Society: Is the Icelandic Case Somehow Different?" in *School Dropout and Completion: International Comparative Studies in Theory and Policy*, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 233–251.

BLOSSFELD, H.-P. (2009): "Educational assortative marriage in comparative perspective," *Annual review of sociology*, 35, 513–530.

CALONICO, S., M. D. CATTANEO, AND R. TITIUNIK (2014): "Robust nonparametric confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs," *Econometrica*, 82, 2295–2326.

CAMERON, S. V. AND C. TABER (2004): "Estimation of educational borrowing constraints using returns to schooling," *Journal of political Economy*, 112, 132–182.

CARD, D. (1999): "The causal effect of education on earnings," in *Handbook of labor economics*, Elsevier, vol. 3, 1801–1863.

CARD, D. AND T. LEMIEUX (2001a): "Can falling supply explain the rising return to college for younger men? A cohort-based analysis," *The quarterly journal of economics*, 116, 705–746.

——— (2001b): "Dropout and enrollment trends in the postwar period: What went wrong in the 1970s?" in *Risky behavior among youths: An economic analysis*, University of Chicago Press, 439–482.

CARNEIRO, P., J. J. HECKMAN, AND E. J. VYTLACIL (2011): "Estimating marginal returns to education," *American Economic Review*, 101, 2754–81.

CARRILLO, B. (2020): "Present bias and underinvestment in education? long-run effects of childhood exposure to booms in colombia," *Journal of Labor Economics*, 38, 1127–1265.

CASCIO, E. U. AND A. NARAYAN (2020): "Who Needs a Fracking Education? The Educational Response to Low-Skill-Biased Technological Change," *ILR Review*, 1–34.

CASTILLO, M., P. J. FERRARO, J. L. JORDAN, AND R. PETRIE (2011): "The today and tomorrow of kids: Time preferences and educational outcomes of children," *Journal of Public Economics*, 95, 1377–1385.

CESARINI, D., E. LINDQVIST, R. ÖSTLING, AND A. TERSKAYA (2021): "The Eects of Unearned Wealth on Marital and Fertility Outcomes," Working paper, Stockholm School of Economics.

CHARLES, K. K., E. HURST, AND M. J. NOTOWIDIGDO (2018): "Housing Booms and Busts, Labor Market Opportunities, and College Attendance," *American Economic Review*, 108, 2947–94.

COHEN, J., K. M. ERICSON, D. LAIBSON, AND J. M. WHITE (2020): "Measuring time preferences," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 58, 299–347.

CUNHA, F., J. HECKMAN, AND S. NAVARRO (2005): "Separating uncertainty from heterogeneity in life cycle earnings," *oxford Economic papers*, 57, 191–261.

DELLAS, H. AND P. SAKELLARIS (2003): "On the cyclicality of schooling: theory and evidence," *oxford Economic papers*, 55, 148–172.

ECKSTEIN, Z. AND K. I. WOLPIN (1999): "Why youths drop out of high school: The impact of preferences, opportunities, and abilities," *Econometrica*, 67, 1295–1339.

EMERY, J. H., A. FERRER, AND D. GREEN (2012): "Long-term consequences of natural resource booms for human capital accumulation," *ILR Review*, 65, 708–734.

EPPER, T., E. FEHR, H. FEHR-DUDA, C. T. KREINER, D. D. LASSEN, S. LETH-PETERSEN, AND G. N. RASMUSSEN (2020): "Time discounting and wealth inequality," *American Economic Review*, 110, 1177–1205.

FREDERICK, S., G. LOEWENSTEIN, AND T. O'DONOGHUE (2002): "Time discounting and time preference: A critical review," *Journal of economic literature*, 40, 351–401.

FREDRIKSSON, P., B. ÖCKERT, AND H. OOSTERBEEK (2013): "Long-term effects of class size," *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 128, 249–285.

GOLDIN, C. (1998): "America's graduation from high school: The evolution and spread of secondary schooling in the twentieth century," *The Journal of Economic History*, 58, 345–374.

——— (2021): "Colleges Have a Guy Problem." Interview, *The Atlantic*.

GOLDIN, C. AND L. F. KATZ (1997): "Why the United States led in education: Lessons from secondary school expansion, 1910 to 1940," Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.

GOLDIN, C., L. F. KATZ, AND I. KUZIEMKO (2006): "The homecoming of American college women: The reversal of the college gender gap," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20, 133–156.

GOLOSOV, M., M. GRABER, M. MOGSTAD, AND D. NOVGORODSKY (2024): "How Americans Respond to Idiosyncratic and Exogenous Changes in Household Wealth and Unearned Income," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 139, 1321–1395.

GRUBER, J. (2001): *Risky Behavior among Youths: An Economic Analysis*, University of Chicago Press.

GUSTMAN, A. L. AND T. L. STEINMEIER (1981): "The impact of wages and unemployment on youth enrollment and labor supply," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 553–560.

HARMON, C. AND I. WALKER (1995): "Estimates of the economic return to schooling for the United Kingdom," *The American Economic Review*, 85, 1278–1286.

HECKMAN, J. J. AND P. A. LAFONTAINE (2010): "The American high school graduation rate: Trends and levels," *The review of economics and statistics*, 92, 244–262.

HECKMAN, J. J., L. J. LOCHNER, AND P. E. TODD (2006a): "Earnings functions, rates of return and treatment effects: The Mincer equation and beyond," *Handbook of the Economics of Education*, 1, 307–458.

HECKMAN, J. J., J. STIXRUD, AND S. URZUA (2006b): "The effects of cognitive and noncognitive abilities on labor market outcomes and social behavior," *Journal of Labor economics*, 24, 411–482.

HILGER, N. G. (2016): "Parental job loss and children's long-term outcomes: Evidence from 7 million fathers' layoffs," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 8, 247–283.

IMAI, T., T. A. RUTTER, AND C. F. CAMERER (2021): "Meta-Analysis of Present-Bias Estimation Using Convex Time Budgets," *The Economic Journal*, 131, 1788–1814.

JACOB, B. A. (2002): "Where the boys aren't: Non-cognitive skills, returns to school and the gender gap in higher education," *Economics of Education review*, 21, 589–598.

JENSEN, R. (2010): "The (perceived) returns to education and the demand for schooling," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125, 515–548.

JOHNSON, M. T. (2013): "The impact of business cycle fluctuations on graduate school enrollment," *Economics of education review*, 34, 122–134.

JÓNASSON, J. T. AND K. S. BLÖNDAL (2002): *Ungt fólk og framhaldsskólinn. Rannsókn á námsgengi og afstöðu '75 árgangsins til náms*, Reykjavík: Social Science Research Institute, University of Iceland and University Press.

KANE, T. J. (1994): "College entry by blacks since 1970: The role of college costs, family background, and the returns to education," *Journal of political Economy*, 102, 878–911.

KEARNEY, M. S. AND R. WILSON (2018): "Male earnings, marriageable men, and nonmarital fertility: Evidence from the fracking boom," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 100, 678–690.

KIRKEBØEN, L., E. LEUVEN, M. MOGSTAD, AND J. MOUNTJOY (2021): "College as a Marriage Market," NBER Working Paper 28688.

KOLESÁR, M. AND C. ROTHE (2018): "Inference in regression discontinuity designs with a discrete running variable," *American Economic Review*, 108, 2277–2304.

KREBS, T. (2007): "Job displacement risk and the cost of business cycles," *American Economic Review*, 97, 664–686.

KREMER, M. (2002): "Should taxes be independent of age?" Unpublished paper, Harvard University.

KRUSELL, P., T. MUKOYAMA, A. ŞAHIN, AND A. A. SMITH JR (2009): "Revisiting the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles," *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 12, 393–404.

KUREISHI, W., H. PAULE-PALUDKIEWICZ, H. TSUJIYAMA, AND M. WAKABAYASHI (2021): "Time preferences over the life cycle and household saving puzzles," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 124, 123–139.

LAIBSON, D. (1997): "Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112, 443–478.

LEE, D. S. AND T. LEMIEUX (2010): "Regression discontinuity designs in economics," *Journal of economic literature*, 48, 281–355.

LEVITT, S. D., J. A. LIST, S. NECKERMANN, AND S. SADOFF (2016): "The behavioralist goes to school: Leveraging behavioral economics to improve educational performance," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 8, 183–219.

LOVENHEIM, M. F. AND K. J. MUMFORD (2013): "Do family wealth shocks affect fertility choices? Evidence from the housing market," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 95, 464–475.

LUCAS, R. E. (1987): *Models of business cycles*, vol. 26, Basil Blackwell Oxford.

MANSKI, C. F. (1993): "Adolescent Econometricians: How Do Youth Infer the Returns to Schooling?" in *Studies of Supply and Demand in Higher Education*, ed. by C. T. Clotfelter and M. Rothschild, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

MARE, R. D. (1991): "Five decades of educational assortative mating," *American sociological review*, 15–32.

MINCER, J. (1958): "Investment in human capital and personal income distribution," *Journal of political economy*, 66, 281–302.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (2002): *The Educational System in Iceland*, 6 ed.

NAKAMURA, E., J. SIGURDSSON, AND J. STEINSSON (2022): "The gift of moving: Intergenerational consequences of a mobility shock," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 89, 1557–1592.

NGUYEN, T. (2008): "Information, role models and perceived returns to education: Experimental evidence from Madagascar," Ph. D. thesis, MIT.

OREOPOULOS, P. (2006): "Estimating average and local average treatment effects of education when compulsory schooling laws really matter," *American Economic Review*, 96, 152–175.

——— (2007a): "Do dropouts drop out too soon? Wealth, health and happiness from compulsory schooling," *Journal of public Economics*, 91, 2213–2229.

——— (2007b): "Would more compulsory schooling help disadvantaged youth? Evidence from recent changes to school-leaving laws," in *The problems of disadvantaged youth: An economic perspective*, University of Chicago Press, 85–112.

OREOPOULOS, P., M. PAGE, AND A. H. STEVENS (2008): "The intergenerational effects of worker displacement," *Journal of Labor Economics*, 26, 455–483.

PENCAVEL, J. (1998): "Assortative mating by schooling and the work behavior of wives and husbands," *The American Economic Review*, 88, 326–329.

PHELPS, E. S. AND R. A. POLLAK (1968): "On second-best national saving and game-equilibrium growth," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 35, 185–199.

RAFNSDÓTTIR, G. L. (1999): *Barn-och ungdomsarbete i Norden*, Nordic Council of Ministers.

RAMSEY, F. P. (1927): "A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON," *J*, 47, 58.

SCHALLER, J. (2016): "Booms, busts, and fertility testing the becker model using gender-specific labor demand," *Journal of Human Resources*, 51, 1–29.

SHAH, M. AND B. M. STEINBERG (2017): "Drought of opportunities: Contemporaneous and long-term impacts of rainfall shocks on human capital," *Journal of Political Economy*, 125, 527–561.

SIGURDSSON, J. (2025): "Labor Supply Responses and Adjustment Frictions: A Tax-Free Year in Iceland," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 17, 30–71.

STATISTICS ICELAND (2008): "Nemendur og námslok við 24 ára aldur," Statistical series, Statistics Iceland.

——— (2022a): "Brautskráningarhlutfall og árgangsbrotthvarf af framhaldsskólastigi 1995-2020," Statistical series, Statistics Iceland.

——— (2022b): "Brautskráðir nemendur eftir skólastigi, landsvæði, aldursflokki og kyni," Statistical series, Statistics Iceland.

STEINBERG, L., S. GRAHAM, L. O'BRIEN, J. WOOLARD, E. CAUFFMAN, AND M. BANICH (2009): "Age differences in future orientation and delay discounting," *Child development*, 80, 28–44.

STUART, B. A. (2022): "The long-run effects of recessions on education and income," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 14, 42–74.

TOPEL, R. H. AND M. P. WARD (1992): "Job mobility and the careers of young men," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107, 439–479.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (2021): *Digest of Education Statistics, 2020*, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences.

WEINZIERL, M. (2011): "The surprising power of age-dependent taxes," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 78, 1490–1518.

WILLIS, R. J. AND S. ROSEN (1979): "Education and self-selection," *Journal of political Economy*, 87, S7–S36.

WILSON, W. J. AND K. M. NECKERMAN (1986): "Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't," in *Poverty and family structure: The widening gap between evidence and public policy issues.*, ed. by S. Danziger and D. Weinberg, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 232–59.

ZIMMERMAN, S. D. (2014): "The returns to college admission for academically marginal students," *Journal of Labor Economics*, 32, 711–754.




Figure 3: Research Design: Tax-free Year and School-leaving Age

*Notes:* The figure is a diagram of the research design, which leverages a tax-free year and discontinuity in the compulsory schooling age. The top panel illustrates the transition from a retrospective income tax system to a pay-as-you-earn system. Under the old system, taxes on income earned in year $t$ were collected in year $t+1$; under the new system taxes are withheld contemporaneously. The transition implied that income earned in 1987 was never taxed. The bottom panel shows the structure of the Icelandic education system by age. The research design exploits the discontinuity at the school-leaving age of 16: students below this threshold are required to remain in compulsory schooling, while those at or above it are free to choose whether to continue into upper-secondary education. Higher education lies outside the estimation bandwidth.




(a) Post-compulsory degree




(b) Years of school

Figure 4: School Dropout

*Notes:* The figure plots average educational attainment at age 21 on each side of the compulsory-school age threshold. Panel (a) plots the average share with post-compulsory education. Panel (b) plots the average number of years of school completed. The vertical line denotes the compulsory schooling age threshold. The vertical line denotes the compulsory schooling age threshold. Dots are four-month age bins through. I plot fitted linear trends through the dots on each side of the compulsory schooling age threshold and their 95% confidence intervals.




(a) Men: Junior college and vocational degree




(b) Men: Years of school




(c) Women: Junior college and vocational degree




(d) Women: Years of school

Figure 5: Dynamics of the Effect of Tax-Free Year on School Dropout and Educational Attainment

*Notes:* The figure plots estimates using an RD-based event study design, where each coefficient corresponds to an RD estimate at a given age of 16-40. Vertical lines mark the expected—or normal—graduation age from upper secondary school, which is 20. Panels (a) and (c) plot the estimated effects of the tax-free year on completing junior college and vocational degrees among men and women, respectively. Panels (b) and (d) plot the estimated effects of the tax-free year on years of schooling completed among men and women, respectively. Regressions control for pre-reform characteristics at age 16 including the region of residence, an indicator for having a child, an indicator for receiving social insurance, an indicator for being fatherless or motherless, and disability status. The shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals, where the standard errors are clustered at the individual level.




Figure 6: Entry Jobs of School Dropouts

*Notes:* The figure presents the estimated effect on employment by occupation. The lower part of each bar represents the employment share in that occupation among 16-19-year-olds, separately for men and women, in the pre-reform year 1986. At the top of each bar, I plot the estimated effect on employment in that occupation among 16-19-year-olds. Occupations are ordered along the horizontal axis by the pre-reform rank of average income among 16-19-year-old employees. For example, prior to the reform, 16-19-year-olds earned the highest income if employed in fishing but the least if employed as service workers. Occupations are classified based on the Icelandic version of the ISCO-88 code, where occupations are organized within industry. Regressions control for pre-reform characteristics at age 16 including the region of residence, an indicator for having a child, an indicator for receiving social insurance, an indicator for being fatherless or motherless, and an indicator for receiving disability benefits. The whiskers display the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.




(a) Men at Upper-Secondary School Age

(b) Women at Upper-Secondary School Age

(c) Men at Prime Age

(d) Women at Prime Age

Figure 7: Labor Income at Upper-Secondary School Age and Prime Age

*Notes:* The figure reports the effect of the tax-free year on labor income. Panels (a) and (b) plot the average annual labor income at upper-secondary school age (16-20) around the compulsory schooling age threshold for men and women, respectively. Panels (c) and (d) plot the average annual labor income at prime age (31-40) around the compulsory schooling age threshold for men and women, respectively. The vertical line denotes the compulsory schooling age threshold. Dots are four-month age bins through. I plot fitted linear trends through the dots on each side of the compulsory schooling age threshold and their 95% confidence intervals.




(a) Effect on Annual Labor Earnings




(b) Effect on Cumulative Labor Earnings

Figure 8: Effects of Tax-Free Year on Labor Earnings in Short and Long Run

*Notes:* The figure reports the effect of the tax-free year on labor earnings in the short and long run. Panel (a) plots RD estimates using equation (1) of the effect of the tax-free year on annual labor income. The bars correspond to average effects at each age interval. Panel (b) plots RD estimates using equation (1) of the effect of the tax-free year on cumulative labor income. The bars correspond to estimates of equation (1) of the effect on accumulated labor earnings over upper-secondary school age 16-20 and the dots correspond to effects on accumulated labor earnings over time from age 21 to 40. Regressions control for year and region fixed effects and pre-reform characteristics at age 16 including an indicator for having a child, an indicator for receiving social insurance, an indicator for being fatherless or motherless, and disability status. The whiskers in panel (a) and crosses in panel (b) display the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.




Figure 9: Effect on Career Progression

*Notes:* The figure plots the effect on the worker's relative position within the firm or industry of employment. Career progression is measured by the rank of the worker's residualized, or 'Mincerized', earnings within the firm or industry. That is, earnings are regressed on gender, age, and interaction of age and gender, and ranks are based on residuals from this regression. The dots/squares correspond to estimates of equation (1) on earnings rank, which I divide by the below-threshold, or control group, mean rank, measured as 12-month averages below the age threshold, to measure the percentage change in ranks. Regressions control for year and region fixed effects and pre-reform characteristics at age 16 including an indicator for having a child, an indicator for receiving social insurance, an indicator for being fatherless or motherless, and disability status. The whiskers display the 95% confidence interval based on robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.




Figure 10: Effect of School Dropout on Marriage and Fertility

*Notes:* The figure presents estimates of equation (1) of the effect on marriage and fertility. *Married* is an indicator of ever having been married by age 40. The below-threshold mean is 0.59 (0.64) for men (women). *Has children* is an indicator of having had children by age 40. The below-threshold mean is 0.80 (0.89) for men (women). *Number of children* is the number of children the individual has had by age 40. The below-threshold mean is 1.92 (2.18) for men (women). Estimates are reported as the ratio of the treatment effect to the below-threshold, or control group mean, measured as 12-month averages below the age threshold, to measure the percentage change in outcome. Regressions control for pre-reform characteristics at age 16 including the region of residence, an indicator for having a child, an indicator for receiving social insurance, an indicator for being fatherless or motherless, and an indicator for receiving disability benefits. The whiskers display the 95% confidence interval where standard errors are calculated using the Delta method.




Figure 11: Dropout Responses to the Tax-Free Year by Parental and Neighborhood Characteristics

*Notes:* The figure shows the estimated effects of the tax-free year on school dropout among men, by parental background and neighborhood characteristics. For each characteristic, students are divided into two groups, and I estimate equation (1), interacting group indicators with the discontinuity and age polynomials. For parental education, students are split according to whether at least one parent has completed an academic upper-secondary degree (high school or more). The share of parents with this level of education is 29 percent. For parental income, I rank all individuals in the population by labor income within each birth cohort, gender, and calendar year. I then compute the median income rank of parents at ages 40-60. Each student is assigned the rank of the higher-earning parent, and students are split at the median parental income rank. To split by parental returns to education, I estimate, on a panel covering the full population of men in the fathers' birth cohorts, a regression of log earnings on birth cohort indicators, their interactions with years of schooling, and year and location fixed effects. Fathers of students in the sample are classified by the sign of their average residual over the years observed: a positive residual (earnings above what education predicts) corresponds to low returns in the figure and a negative residual to high returns. The former group is 46 percent of fathers. Municipalities are classified as urban or rural based on official municipality codes. 30 percent of parents reside in urban municipalities. For neighborhood education, I calculate, for each municipality, the share of adults (aged 25-64) with an academic upper-secondary degree in the year before the tax-free year (1986), and split students at the median of this distribution. For neighborhood returns to education, I compute, for each municipality, average labor income in 1986 for adult men, separately by education level (academic upper-secondary degree vs. less). Municipal returns are calculated as the ratio of these averages, and students are split at the median return. All regressions control for individual characteristics measured before the reform. Regressions by parental background additionally include municipality fixed effects. Whiskers denote 95% confidence intervals. Asterisks indicate the significance of tests for equality of coefficients across groups (** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$).

Table 1: Tax Rates for Workers Aged 16-20

| | All (1) | Men (2) | Women (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average tax rate | 8.3% | 10.1% | 5.6% |
| Marginal tax rate | 15.8% | 18.8% | 11.5% |

*Notes:* This table reports average and marginal tax rates for 16-20-year-olds working at least 36 weeks (9 months) during the year. Numbers are averages over the years 1984-1986.

Table 2: Effect on School Dropout and Educational Attainment

| | Post compulsory degree | | Junior college degree | | Vocational degree | | Pre-university Years of school | | University degree | | Years of school | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| | | | | | | A. All | | | | | | |
| Treatment effect | -0.033*** | -0.034*** | -0.030*** | -0.027*** | 0.003 | -0.002 | -0.106*** | -0.108*** | -0.016 | -0.014 | -0.200*** | -0.192*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.035) | (0.034) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.074) | (0.073) |
| Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Outcome mean | 0.650 | 0.650 | 0.446 | 0.446 | 0.159 | 0.159 | 12.25 | 12.25 | 0.449 | 0.449 | 14.36 | 14.36 |
| Observations | 34,654 | 34,654 | 34,654 | 34,654 | 34,654 | 34,654 | 34,650 | 34,650 | 34,654 | 34,654 | 34,654 | 34,654 |
| | | | | | | B. Men | | | | | | |
| Treatment effect | -0.048*** | -0.050*** | -0.048*** | -0.049*** | 0.008 | 0.007 | -0.135*** | -0.145*** | -0.015 | -0.017 | -0.244** | -0.262** |
| | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.102) | (0.102) |
| Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Outcome mean | 0.631 | 0.631 | 0.365 | 0.365 | 0.239 | 0.239 | 12.08 | 12.08 | 0.350 | 0.350 | 13.82 | 13.82 |
| Observations | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 | 17,694 |
| | | | | | | C. Women | | | | | | |
| Treatment effect | -0.016 | -0.018 | -0.006 | -0.005 | -0.009 | -0.010 | -0.064 | -0.068 | -0.010 | -0.010 | -0.119 | -0.119 |
| | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.050) | (0.050) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.104) | (0.104) |
| Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Outcome mean | 0.668 | 0.668 | 0.525 | 0.525 | 0.0812 | 0.0812 | 12.42 | 12.42 | 0.545 | 0.545 | 14.88 | 14.88 |
| Observations | 16,960 | 16,960 | 16,960 | 16,960 | 16,960 | 16,960 | 16,956 | 16,956 | 16,960 | 16,960 | 16,960 | 16,960 |

*Notes:* This table reports the estimated effect of the tax-free year on school dropout and educational attainment, estimated using the RD regression equation (1). Each cell represents a single a regression estimate for the education outcome specified in the row heading. The estimates are based on local-linear regressions for individuals at age 40 and allow for different coefficients on each side of the cutoff. Outcome mean refers to averages of the dependent variable over 12 months below the threshold, i.e., a control group. Regressions control for gender and pre-reform characteristics at age 16 including the region of residence, an indicator for having a child, an indicator for receiving social insurance, an indicator for being fatherless or motherless, and an indicator for receiving disability benefits. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 3: Effect on Labor Market Outcomes and Wealth

| | Age 16-20 | | Age 36-40 | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Earnings (1) | Employment (2) | Earnings (3) | Employment (4) | Non-labor Income (5) | Total Wealth (6) | Real Estate (7) | Financial Wealth (8) |
| | | | | A. All | | | | |
| Treatment effect | 484*** | 0.036*** | -1,095** | 0.003 | -354 | -8,078** | -6,690** | -1,175 |
| | (105) | (0.007) | (517) | (0.006) | (283) | (3,546) | (2,625) | (1,730) |
| Outcome mean | 8,906 | 0.336 | 33,995 | 0.829 | 6,124 | 195,103 | 167,670 | 27,087 |
| Observations | 153,131 | 153,131 | 150,543 | 150,543 | 150,543 | 150,543 | 150,543 | 150,543 |
| | | | | B. Men | | | | |
| Treatment effect | 838*** | 0.050*** | -2,147** | -0.001 | -626 | -15,539*** | -11,065*** | -4,202 |
| | (180) | (0.010) | (871) | (0.007) | (417) | (5,199) | (3,750) | (2,605) |
| Outcome mean | 10,487 | 0.425 | 41,927 | 0.863 | 5,405 | 186,704 | 158,362 | 27,976 |
| Observations | 78,247 | 78,247 | 76,269 | 76,269 | 76,269 | 76,269 | 76,269 | 76,269 |
| | | | | C. Women | | | | |
| Treatment effect | 96 | 0.021** | -262 | 0.005 | -51 | -823 | -2,443 | 1,770 |
| | (99) | (0.009) | (531) | (0.009) | (381) | (4,824) | (3,669) | (2,282) |
| Outcome mean | 7,342 | 0.248 | 26,247 | 0.796 | 6,826 | 203,306 | 176,760 | 26,220 |
| Observations | 74,884 | 74,884 | 74,274 | 74,274 | 74,274 | 74,274 | 74,274 | 74,274 |

*Notes:* This table reports the coefficient of the treatment indicator according to the regression equation (1), where each cell represents a single regression estimate for the outcome measure specified in the row heading. Outcome mean refers to 12-month averages at the left of the threshold. Total wealth is the sum of all assets, financial and non-financial. Real estate is the tax-based value of the real estate. Financial wealth is the difference between total wealth and real estate wealth.Regressions control for year and region fixed effects and pre-reform characteristics at age 16 including an indicator for having a child, an indicator for receiving social insurance, an indicator for being fatherless or motherless, and disability status. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$